“Evers’ judges” is our effort to present information about Gov. Tony Evers’ appointees to the bench. The information is taken from the appointees’ own judgeship applications.
 
Italics indicate direct quotes from the application.​ Typos, including punctuation errors, come from the original application even though we have not inserted “(sic)” after each one. WJI has left them as is.

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 Name: Nathan Petrashek
 
Appointed to: Court of Appeals District 1
 
Appointment date: Feb. 27, 2026, to term ending July 31, 2027
 
Education:
Law School – Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Undergraduate – University of Wisconsin-Green Bay
High School – Washington High, Two Rivers, Wisconsin
 
Recent legal employment:
June 2024-present – Adjunct professor of law, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
June 2021-present – Staff attorney, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Waukesha, Wisconsin
August 2009-June 2021 – Law clerk, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Wausau, Wisconsin
 
Bar and administrative memberships:
State Bar of Wisconsin
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
 
General character of practice:
I am a central staff attorney at the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. We are an appointed group of institutional attorneys providing judicial and legal assistance to the court as a whole. Our primary responsibility is to provide legal services equivalent to that of in-house counsel to judges and to the clerk of the court of appeals, allowing the court to efficiently and effectively process matters to resolution (typically via a written opinion or order).
 
One important aspect of my practice is resolving a share of the approximately 19,000 motions filed annually in the court of appeals (2024 annual report). Nearly every order issued by the court has been prepared by a staff attorney, who performs the necessary research, consults with judges, and drafts and approves the orders that ultimately issue. As the volume might suggest, this work requires a reflexive knowledge of appellate procedure in civil, criminal, and other specialized contexts (e.g., termination of parental rights cases). Motions work requires careful scrutiny of dozens of daily filings encompassing every procedural aspect of an appeal, from the sufficiency of the notice of appeal to remittitur.
 
As a staff attorney I also have primary drafting and research responsibility for a large portion of the district’s docket. Staff attorneys write, under judge supervision, the majority of each district’s per curiam and summary disposition opinions, which include matters covering nearly every practice area. As a result, staff attorneys have an extraordinary breadth of knowledge on a diverse set of legal topics.
 
In addition to the above, I handle a share of the court’s no-merit appeals, petitions for leave to appeal, and writ petitions. No-merit appeals require staff attorneys to thoroughly examine the case record to fulfill the court’s constitutional responsibility to ascertain whether any issue of arguable merit exists for an appeal in cases with appointed counsel. Interlocutory appeals are granted only by leave of the court if certain criteria are met, and staff attorneys make recommendations on those matters to a judge panel. Writ petitions commence original actions in the court of appeals, typically seeking supervisory or habeas relief, and staff attorneys make recommendations as to whether such relief is appropriate or whether further procedural steps (e.g., remand for fact-finding) are necessary prior to resolving the petition.
 
Describe typical clients:
As a judicial officer, I do not have “clients” in the conventional sense, but my ethical and professional obligations are to the judges and institutional actors I counsel. I aim to provide them with accurate and insightful legal guidance to allow them to make fully informed and legally supported decisions. While my judicial work has touched on virtually every practice area and legal topic, I have extensive experience with appellate procedure, criminal procedure, and sexually violent person commitments under ch. 980.
 
Number of cases tried to verdict: None
 
List up to three significant trials, appeals, or other legal matters in which you participated as a judge or lawyer in the past seven years:
I offer below three significant cases in which I participated at the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, with the caveat that much of my work in the judicial system occurs during the deliberative process and while producing judicial opinions.  The three cases below are decisions for which I bore primary drafting responsibility, and I believe the final opinions are fair representations of my knowledge, skills and abilities. The final decisions are, of course, the work of the court as a whole, and while I am not at liberty to discuss the judges’ internal deliberations or thought processes, I am happy to discuss the issues presented by these cases and the final opinions.

State v. Lee
, Appeal No. 2019AP221-CR. This central issue in this case was one that, unfortunately, routinely occurs in the Wisconsin court system: a lack of available attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. Nhia Lee waited more than three months for counsel to be appointed on felony drug charges. As Lee repeatedly asked for counsel, the courts regularly found “good cause” to extend the ten-day time period for holding the preliminary hearing—the good cause being the fact that Lee did not yet have State Public Defender representation. When counsel was finally appointed, Lee sought to dismiss the criminal complaint because of the delay.

This case was significant because it established that a prolonged failure by the State Public Defender to timely appoint counsel does not, standing alone, constitute good cause absent a more probing examination of the reasons for the delay and the efficacy of appointing counsel at county expense. Ultimately, the case against Lee was dismissed without prejudice, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed a petition for review as improvidently granted after hearing oral argument. 

Murr v. Wisconsin
, Appeal No. 2013AP2828. For decades prior to this case, parties had struggled with the U.S. Supreme Court’s regulatory Takings Clause jurisprudence, which required a comparison of the value that had been taken from the property by the pertinent government regulation with the value of the property that remained. But how is that remaining value to be ascertained? The so-called “denominator problem” was the often outcome-determinative question of how narrowly to define the total unit of property when measuring what the government regulation had confiscated. The problem presented itself in concrete terms in the Murr case, where two of the landowners’ lots were effectively merged by operation of a St. Croix County ordinance that forbade the lots’ separate sale or development. The landowners sought compensation for the lots’ singular treatment under the ordinance, alleging that the law accomplished a regulatory taking that deprived them of all or substantially all of the value of one of their lots.
 
Analyzing the Murrs’ lots as a whole, the Court of Appeals decision held that no taking had occurred because the Murrs’ contiguous property sufficed as a single, buildable lot under the ordinance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied a petition for review, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a majority opinion affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision on direct review, Justice Kennedy set forth a multi-factor approach for resolving denominator problems that will guide Takings Clause jurisprudence for the foreseeable future.

Moran v. DOJ
, Appeal No. 2018AP563. This case presented significant questions regarding the interpretation of Wisconsin’s statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a firearm and whether certain aspects of the statute were preempted by federal law. Moran had been convicted of a felony in Virginia and had subsequently had his civil rights restored there. He had not, however, received a pardon for his crime, which is a statutory prerequisite to lawful possession in Wisconsin.
 
Moran brought suit after the Wisconsin Department of Justice blocked his attempt to purchase a firearm in this state. Featuring a comparative analysis of the Governor’s pardon power under Wisconsin law with that of the pardon power in Virginia, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial, concluding that Moran could not lawfully possess a firearm under the pardon exception, the exception was not preempted by federal law, and the statute did not violate either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or Moran’s Second Amendment rights.
 
Experience in adversary proceedings before administrative bodies:
I have not served as an advocate in administrative proceedings. However, in the appellate context, I regularly engage in review of administrative agency and municipal decisions. As a result, I have considerable knowledge of the administrative review process under Wis. Stat. ch. 227 and common law certiorari review.
 
For examples of administrative review cases on which I had primary drafting responsibility, please see Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay . . . (reversing a city’s decision to revoke a conditional use permit); and Bethards v. DWD . . . (upholding on ch. 227 review the equal rights division’s interpretation of a whistleblower statute).
 
Describe your non-litigation experience (e.g., arbitration, mediation).
In 2023 and 2024, the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Legal Education Committee, on which I serve, developed a revised rules petition for the creation of Cultural Competency and Reduction of Bias training as a category of attorney CLE credits. The resulting rules petition I helped develop was approved by the State Bar Board of Governors, and on July 11, 2025, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued Final Order 24-04 granting the petition.
 
Position or involvement in judicial, non-partisan, or partisan political campaign, committee, or organization:
Volunteer, Susan Crawford for Wisconsin (2024)
Volunteer, Pedro Colon for Milwaukee (2023)
Volunteer, Ramos for Judge (2023)
Volunteer, Anderson for Milwaukee (2023)
Volunteer, Murray for Judge (2023)
Volunteer, Amber for Milwaukee (2023)
Volunteer, Fragoso for Judge (2023)
Volunteer, Crowley for County Executive (2023)
Volunteer, Goyke for Milwaukee (2022)
Volunteer, Biden for President (2020)
Volunteer, Fallone for Justice (2013)
Campaign Staff, McCormick for Congress (2006)
Volunteer, Bush for President (2004)
 
Previous runs for public office: None listed
 
All judicial or non-partisan candidates endorsed in the last ten years:
Pedro Colon, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2023
David Crowley, Milwaukee County Executive, 2023
Raphael Ramos, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 2023
Anderson Gansner, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 2023
Jorge Fragoso, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 2023
Ronnie Murray, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 2023
Amber Raffeet August, Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 2023
Evan Goyke, Milwaukee City Attorney, 2022
Ed Fallone, Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2013
JoAnne Kloppenburg, Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2011
 
Professional or civic and charitable organizations:
City of Glendale, election inspector, 2024-Present
American Constitution Society, member, 2023-Present
American Bar Association, Council of Appellate Staff Attorneys , 2023-Present
Milwaukee Bar Association, 2019-Present
State Bar of Wisconsin, Appellate Practice Board, CLE Committee, 2009-Present
Federalist Society, member, 2007-2009
 
Significant pro bono legal work or volunteer service:
As a first-generation college student who had to navigate the complex world of post-secondary education on my own, I recognize the advantages enjoyed by students who have an experienced person to call on for career and educational advice. I’m honored to provide guidance through UW-Green Bay’s Mentor Collective, which matches professionals with first-generation college students.
 
I volunteer as an Election Inspector for the City of Glendale, working to ensure that all qualified individuals are empowered to exercise their right to vote.
 
In the legal sphere, I serve on several State Bar of Wisconsin committees, including as a board member of the Appellate Practice Section where I help with the section’s “Best Briefs” competition. I regularly serve as a brief grader and oral argument judge for various law school moot court activities and as a comment grading professor for the Marquette Law Review.
 
Quotes:
 
Why I want to be a judge:
I feel called to serve the people of Wisconsin as a judge because, like many residents, I am deeply concerned about the state of our justice system and the vibrancy of our democracy. More than at any other time in our recent history, the judiciary is an institution under stress from internal and external forces. Internally, the courts are strained by an ever-growing docket that imperils a judge’s ability to give any one particular case the attention it deserves. Longstanding inequities in the criminal justice system persist—among them delays in appointing counsel, lamentable conditions of confinement and well-documented sentencing disparities. And externally, the rule of law is under constant attack by political actors who seeks to trample on the independence of the third branch.
 
In this moment, it is especially important for those with courage, tenacity, and skill to step up and face these challenges head on. As I explain in more detail below, the court of appeals offers a unique opportunity to showcase procedural fairness while educating the public about the crucial role of the courts in our society. I also want to continue the legacy of my many court mentors who have modeled exemplary judicial behavior during their service on the bench. Along the way, I hope to add my voice to the many already doing the hard work of pushing for changes that will improve justice outcomes for our neighbors. In short, I hope that I can do as a judge what I endeavor to do in every aspect of my life—leave things in a better place than I found them.
 
In expressing these lofty goals, I do not intend to understate the importance of the day-to-day work of the court of appeals. I know perhaps better than any other candidate that while the title of court of appeals judge holds some glamour, any such pretense falls aways under the demands of the daily routine, which is filled with piles of briefs, hours of editing, and late nights of research. The work is challenging, yet it is work I love. I have committed my 16-year career to making sure that the court of appeals delivers opinions that are pragmatic, rational and legally sound, even in the many cases that do not receive much public scrutiny.
 
My desire to serve is partly animated by my belief that my intellectual abilities, knowledge and skills are well-suited to the role of a court of appeals judge. Standards of appellate review are a conglomeration of doctrines and principles that control the work of the court of appeals, and I co-author one of the primary reference books on the topic. I have written well over 900 appellate court opinions on countless legal topics, and resolved hundreds of motions on matters of appellate procedure. Through it all, I have sought to promote the collegiality and collaboration that is so essential when working in panels with fellow judges. I believe I am uniquely situated to contribute to the development of the law and to the improvement of our justice system as a judge on the court of appeals.
 
Describe which case in the past 25 years by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or U.S. Supreme Court you believe had a significant positive or negative impact on the people of Wisconsin.
In terms of the negative impact on the people of Wisconsin, it would be hard to select any case other than Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022). Under the guise of “return[ing] the issue of abortion to [state] legislative bodies,” id. at 289, the Supreme Court overruled the longstanding constitutional freedom from government regulation that imposes an “undue burden” on the availability of pre-viability abortion services recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). To reach that conclusion, Dobbs cast aside principles of stare decisis and used a constitutionally dubious history-and-tradition approach that wholly excluded the views of the people most affected by the decision. See Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 250.
 
In Wisconsin, as elsewhere, chaos followed. The Dobbs decision left the availability of reproductive healthcare services in Wisconsin governed by a patchwork of conflicting statutes, the oldest of which traced its lineage to just a year after statehood. (Footnote: Indeed, confusion has followed Wisconsin statutes regulating abortion almost since their inception, casting serious doubt on the Supreme Court’s reasoning that the matter is best left in the hands of state legislatures. See Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196 N.W. 233 (1923).)  That statute, WIS. STAT. § 940.04(1), generally made it a crime to intentionally destroy the life of an unborn child. And despite many contradictory statutes enacted by the legislature in Roe’s wake, some state district attorneys, including a candidate for state attorney general, suggested that they would pursue prosecutions under that statute.
 
Doctors were left in the lurch. When Dobbs came down, all abortion-related health care services in Wisconsin stopped. Medical professionals, fearing criminal liability, sharply circumscribed patient services, including for women facing complications in their pregnancies. Patients, too, were anguished to learn that they needed to endure substantial travel and costs to get reproductive healthcare that, just days or weeks earlier, had been routinely available. In Texas alone, patients were permanently injured and one nearly bled to death due to the unwillingness of medical providers to risk exposure to the state’s steep criminal penalties.
 
The uncertainty created by Dobbs persisted in Wisconsin until the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Kaul v. Urmanski, 2025 WI 32, 417 Wis. 2d 257, 22 N.W.3d 740.  Kaul reached the common-sense conclusion that the substantial legislative activity in the ensuing years “so thoroughly covers the entire subject of abortion that it was clearly meant as a substitute for the 19th century near-total ban on abortion.” Id., ¶10. The decision firmly establishing that the post-Roe statutory framework controls the availability of reproductive healthcare in Wisconsin had a significant positive impact on the people of this state.

Two or three judges whom I admire and why:
The four women (if I might be permitted a fourth) I want to highlight here all personify the wisdom, intellect and judicial temperament that I hope to model on the bench: Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Judges Lisa Neubauer and Lisa Stark.

The late Chief Justice Abrahamson deserves our admiration for many reasons, not the least of which was her perseverance in becoming the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s first female justice. Beyond that, I have always been awestruck by her clear, straightforward judicial thinking. At oral argument, her lines of questioning were always logical and insightful, serving both to elucidate the factors that she believed should resolve the case and to persuade her fellow Justices of the correctness of her reasoning. I was impressed with her ability to reduce even the most complex cases to core principles that guided her decision-making.

Sandra Day O’Connor was also a trailblazer as the U.S. Supreme Court’s first female justice. I admired her as a moderating voice on the Court, navigating more extreme positions to find areas of compromise that would avoid the kind of tectonic shifts in the law that have become all too common—a laudable goal in light of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent trend toward issuing fractured opinions.  For example, although Justice O’Connor joined the majority of justices in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), she was instrumental in foiling the more extreme “independent state legislature” theory advocated by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and others. She was an essential vote in Casey for reaffirming the central holding of Roe. After retirement, Justice O’Connor devoted herself to the cause of judicial independence and was famously critical of the decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). I respect and admire Justice O’Connor’s efforts to find compromise and, more broadly, her work to ensure that the judiciary remains an independent and impartial institution.

Finally, I want to acknowledge two judges with whom I have worked closely over the past decade-plus. Judges Lisa Neubauer and Lisa Stark have both demonstrated incredible commitment to the cause of justice during their service on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Their tenures as Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judge, respectively, brought a collegiality to the court that allowed judges to cast aside ego and focus on points of agreement in an effort to propagate public confidence in the judiciary. Their steady hand allowed the court to navigate an ever-growing docket, even as court resources remained stagnant. And of course, on the merits of their work, their intellect and keen sense for justice allowed them to showcase exemplary judicial decision-making and respect for the rule of law. I greatly miss working with Judge Stark on a daily basis (although we do still frequently engage on matters of judicial education), and while Judge Neubauer’s upcoming retirement is much deserved, her absence will be deeply felt in the institution of the courts.

The proper role of a judge:
“Judging is what you make it.”
 
I’ve thought often about that remark by a mentor years ago. She had come to know perhaps hundreds of judges during her legal career, and her point was that the title of judge is only as remarkable as the person bearing it. Someone can act as a judge, in the sense that their decisions have the force of law, without actually doing the hard work of judging.

The proper role of a judge encompasses more than just calling balls and strikes or making decisions. Even in the face of a high case volume, judges (especially those at the appellate level) are rarely performing a mechanical application of facts to law. Cases are usually appealed because they offer something new or different than is covered by the existing legal fabric. Such matters require curiosity, diligence and nuance to appreciate. This is challenging but necessary work if one is to meaningfully contribute to the development of the law.

But a studious approach to cases is not enough. It is fundamentally the appeals court’s job to explain, in writing, what conclusion the court has reached and the factors that led to it. See WIS. STAT. § 752.41(1). The audience for these opinions can include the litigants and their attorneys, circuit court judges, the general public, and perhaps even the justices of higher courts. Writings that are imprecise, disorganized or underdeveloped have a high potential to sow confusion and discord among their audience. Any discussion of the proper role of a judge must include the judge as an effective educator.

Like all communication, judging is a two-way street. Appellate judges are not merely conveyors of wisdom, speaking from on high. A judge must have a listener’s ear and a learner’s mind, allowing other stakeholders in the justice system to teach: attorneys of record who will explain areas of the law with which the judge may be unfamiliar; circuit court judges who must apply the court’s decisions; practitioners who can provide important feedback and reflection on the court’s work; and colleagues with whom the judge must collaborate so that the court speaks with a unified voice as often as possible.

A judge in our system of government must be all of these things—inquisitive, enlightening, and receptive—but courageousness may be the most important trait of all, particularly in today’s political environment. In a prior application, I discussed the courage of the justices in Gillespie v. Palmer, 20 Wis. 544 (1866), to do what was fair and right even in the face of tremendous public skepticism and political opposition. A judge must be steadfast in their commitment to the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. This is the essence of judging: the willingness to adopt counter-majoritarian positions when justice and conscience demand it, and to explain and vigorously defend those decisions using law and logic.