China turns on tariff-free trade for Africa, while Iran turns off the internet. The ICJ’s advisory jurisdiction is back in focus, with the Right to Strike Advisory Opinion handed down a day after the UN General Assembly’s resolution on the Climate Change Opinion. Cruise ships raise complex questions for the international laws governing public health emergencies, while ships bearing stolen Ukrainian grain get us thinking about the duty of non-recognition and the obligation not to assist an unlawful occupation. Domestic litigation continues to raise questions about the changing shape of international law’s footprint on municipal soil, and the ILC’s draft conclusions on subsidiary means for determining rules of international law raise some doubts—not to mention a spirited argument against the scourge of war and for greater control over its conduct by the people of the world.

Global war powers resolution

How to put an end to the savage insanity of war? makes the case that the time has come for a global war powers resolution. It is shocking that in the twenty-first century, two men can plunge into an impulsive and illegal war in Iran and drag the world with them, that states can take no effective action to stop it, that we speak of its human cost in terms of statistics, while progress in the machinery of war threatens the survival of the human species. Drawing on Erasmus, Tolstoy, and Napoleonic history, Philip argues that modern warfare—now conducted through missiles, drones, and cyber systems—has dangerously distanced political leaders from the human reality of mass killing while rendering local conflicts effectively global in consequence. The very notion of “just war” is untenable, casting a veneer of rationality over an enduring human evil. It is time to involve the people of the world, represented in the General Assembly, in the control of wars—through a “Global War Powers Resolution” modelled on the US’s 1973 War Powers Resolution and grounded in the General Assembly’s 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution 377(V).

China’s zero-tariff policy for Africa

argues that China’s May 2026 decision to grant zero-tariff access to all African states with which it maintains diplomatic relations stretches the WTO’s preferential-trade framework beyond its traditional limits. Preferences for African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) can be grounded in paragraph 2(d) of the 1979 Enabling Clause and the WTO LDC waiver. But the extension to non-LDC African states raises potential non-discrimination problems under paragraph 2(a), particularly in light of the Appellate Body’s reasoning in EC–Tariff Preferences. China’s approach differs from conditional Western schemes such as the US African Growth and Opportunity Act and the EU’s Everything But Arms: it replaces governance, humanr rights, or regulatory-based conditionality with a diplomatic-relations requirement (excluding Eswatini, which recognises Taiwan). Although the policy may offer short-term gains, its developmental value ultimately depends on whether the African Continental Free Trade Area can convert external preferences into regional industrialisation rather than deeper dependency.

Iran’s internet blackout

makes the case that Iran’s 53-day wartime internet blackout exposes a fundamental gap in international law by revealing the limits of sovereignty doctrine, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and existing regulation of private satellite operators. Iran’s reliance on sovereignty under Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter is internally contradictory because Tehran invoked sovereignty both to justify shutting down civilian internet access and to condemn SpaceX’s Starlink terminals for restoring connectivity. The blackout likely violates Iran’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; while the precautions framework in Articles 57–58 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions may constrain self-imposed wartime connectivity shutdowns. The emergence of private satellite infrastructure as a civilian communications lifeline in conflict exposes a structural weakness in the state-centric architecture of international law, which lacks rules governing companies that effectively become wartime guarantors of civilian connectivity.

Cruise ships and global health

and argue that the 2026 hantavirus outbreak aboard the MV Hondius exposes the continuing fragmentation of international law governing public health emergencies on cruise ships, despite lessons from COVID-19. While instruments such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Health Regulations (2005), and the Maritime Labour Convention provide overlapping rules on port access, quarantine, and onboard medical care, they leave broad discretion to port states and fail to ensure coordinated responses. For example, Article 28 of the IHR permits denial of port entry where states lack public health capacity, illustrating how sovereignty can override humanitarian imperatives even in emergencies. Recent post-COVID reforms, including the WHO Pandemic Agreement, still neglect cruise ships as a distinct legal problem, leaving passengers and crew dependent on ad hoc diplomacy rather than a coherent framework grounded in human rights and coordinated international obligations.

ILC draft conclusions on subsidiary means for determining rules of international law

criticises the International Law Commission’s 2025 draft conclusion on subsidiary means for determining rules of international law for treating judicial precedent as something tribunals merely “may” follow. While international law rejects formal stare decisis under Article 38(1)(d) of the International Court of Justice Statute, international courts in practice operate with a rebuttable presumption of consistency, requiring “compelling” or “cogent” reasons to depart from prior case law, as reflected in decisions such as Cameroon v. Nigeria, US – Stainless Steel, and Saipem v. Bangladesh. The ILC’s cautious wording fails to capture this cross-systemic judicial methodology and undermines the Commission’s mandate of progressive development under its Statute. The draft conclusion should be reformulated so that prior decisions should generally be followed unless a tribunal can justify departure through compelling reasons such as doctrinal error, changed circumstances, or developments in treaty or customary law.

UN General Assembly’s Climate Change Opinion Resolution 

analyses the UN General Assembly’s May 2026 adoption of resolution A/80/L.65 welcoming the ICJ’s Climate Change Advisory Opinion, presenting the vote as a significant political endorsement of the Court’s 2025 findings on state responsibility for climate harm. The resolution rejects attempts by major fossil-fuel-producing states to confine climate obligations to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Paris Agreement frameworks, instead affirming that states’ duties also arise under customary international law, human rights law, environmental law, and the law of the sea, with breaches triggering the ordinary consequences of state responsibility. Of particular note is the resolution’s endorsement of the ICJ’s findings on sea-level rise, maritime zones, and continuity of statehood for low-lying island nations, as well as its request for a Secretary-General’s report on mechanisms to advance compliance and address gaps in multilateral climate governance. Although the resolution is not legally binding, it strengthens the normative authority of the ICJ opinion and provides climate-vulnerable states and litigants with a powerful legal and political framework for future negotiations and climate litigation.

and focus on the resolution’s integration of biodiversity law—particularly the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)—into the broader framework of states’ obligations to protect the climate system. Following the Court’s unanimous findings, states’ duties extend beyond the Paris Agreement to customary international law and environmental treaties, including CBD obligations to prevent environmental harm through actions affecting carbon sinks, ecosystems, and biodiversity. Noteworthy is the Court’s expansive reading of CBD provisions (notably Articles 3, 6, 7, and 8) and its articulation of a stringent due diligence standard that requires robust regulation of both state and private conduct contributing to biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions. Ultimately, the Advisory Opinion, reinforced by the General Assembly resolution, elevates CBD obligations and COP decisions such as the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework to increasingly authoritative interpretive tools with growing implications for state responsibility and corporate exposure.

Domestic courts: Belgium and New Zealand

draws our attention to an interlocutory ruling of the Brussels Court of Appeal in which Belgian civil society applicants sought measures to prevent Belgium from allegedly breaching its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions in relation to the situation in Gaza. The Court accepted that both instruments have direct effect in Belgian law and applied an ICJ-derived “serious risk” threshold—drawn from cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro—to find that Belgium’s obligation to prevent genocide and serious violations of international humanitarian law may be engaged even absent certainty of commission. It held that this obligation of prevention, grounded also in Common Article 1, requires third states to take all feasible measures within their power, including restrictions on arms transfers, where a credible risk of grave violations is known. This judgment reflects a broader judicial trend towards recognising risk-triggered positive obligations for third states under international law—though the ruling remains interlocutory and its ultimate implications will depend on the merits phase.

But what happens when litigation succeeds? turns to the New Zealand Government’s proposed amendment to the Climate Change Response Act 2002, aimed at excluding tort liability for climate harms. This would foreclose Supreme Court-approved climate litigation brought by Māori environmental activist Mike Smith (Smith v. Fonterra) and may be incompatible with international law. Drawing on the ICJ’s Climate Change Advisory Opinion, a stringent due diligence obligation requires states not only to regulate private emitters but also to maintain effective access to judicial mechanisms capable of constraining emissions, particularly where courts perform a regulatory function through tort claims. Extinguishing climate litigation would likely breach Article 14(1) ICCPR, as interpreted in General Comment No. 32 and comparative jurisprudence such as KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland and Mahuika v. New Zealand, by undermining access to a fair and public hearing in civil proceedings. Finally, the proposed amendment may violate non-regression clauses in New Zealand’s Free Trade Agreements (including Article 19.2.4 EU–NZ FTA and CPTPP Article 20.3.6), and when viewed alongside broader deregulatory climate reforms, reflects a pattern potentially inconsistent with international environmental and investment-related obligations.

Treaty interpretation in the ICJ’s Right to Strike Advisory Opinion

and analyse the ICJ’s approach to treaty interpretation in its recent advisory opinion on the Right to Strike under ILO Convention No. 87, handed down 21 May 2026. The Court held that the ILO Convention No. 87 protects a right to strike, despite its absence from the treaty text, by construing “activities” in Article 3(1) broadly in light of the Convention’s object and purpose. Julian and Justina examine the Court’s Article 31 VCLT reasoning, particularly its reliance on subsequent practice and “systemic integration” with the ICCPR and ICESCR, while noting controversy over whether non-universal treaty practice and cross-treaty norms can evidence a “common understanding” among parties. The Court further treats extensive ILO supervisory practice and regional human rights jurisprudence as confirming the interpretation under both Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, even as several judges criticise the approach as diluting state consent and stretching systemic integration. Overall, the opinion is a significant but methodologically contested expansion of treaty interpretation.

Trade in Ukraine’s stolen grain

examines the diplomatic dispute between Ukraine and Israel following Israel’s alleged importation of grain harvested from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Such trade engages the international law duty of non-recognition of illegal annexations under Article 41(2) ARSIWA and related ICJ jurisprudence, including the 1971 Namibia and 2024 Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinions. Russia’s appropriation and export of grain from occupied territories violate the Hague Regulations, potentially amounting to pillage and a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute. States importing or facilitating trade in such grain risk breaching obligations not to assist unlawful occupations. Nevertheless, these duties are likely obligations of conduct rather than result, meaning Israel’s responsibility may depend on whether it had sufficient notice regarding the grain’s origin before the Abinsk unloaded in Haifa. Ukraine’s provision of timely evidence is crucial to triggering due diligence obligations for importing and third-party states involved in shipping, financing, and insurance linked to trade with occupied territories.

As ever, announcements and events can be found here.