Introduction
Around 800,000 Lebanese residents have been displaced so far since the beginning of this round of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. On 2 March 2026, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) issued evacuation orders directing residents of villages and towns in southern Lebanon to leave their homes and move north of the Litani River, effectively depopulating an area covering about 8% of Lebanon’s territory and affecting hundreds of thousands of residents (here and here). Similar orders followed on 5 March 2026, instructing roughly 400,000 residents of Beirut’s southern suburbs to evacuate (here), and on 12 March 2026, directing residents between the Litani and Zahrani rivers to move north of the Zahrani River (here and here; and see map here). According to Doctors Without Borders, these blanket evacuation orders covered at least 14% of Lebanese territory and displaced more than 800,000 people (here).
Such blanket evacuation orders raise questions as to their legality, especially when a vast civilian population is affected. This article examines the legality of such evacuation orders in the context of armed conflicts. I will begin by providing a brief history of the recent events; second, I will outline the rule of the law regarding the legality of evacuation orders; and third, I will provide my legal analysis in this regard.
Historical background
The tumultuous past between Hezbollah and Israel will not be examined in this post. For present purposes, I should note that armed hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel began on 8 October 2023, after Hezbollah launched missiles onto Israeli bases in occupied territories, ostensibly in support of the Palestinian people (here). In the aftermath of that attack, Hezbollah and Israel engaged in an armed conflict which was supposedly concluded with a ceasefire agreement, beginning 27 November 2024 (here). This agreement held for a few months before Israel resumed targeting, almost on a daily basis, individuals and infrastructure in southern Lebanon (here and here). While international organisations asserted that many of these strikes targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure in violation of the ceasefire agreement (here), the IDF maintained that the sites and individuals in question were affiliated with Hezbollah (here).
More recently, the use of force by the US and Israel against Iran (here) from 28 February 2026, and the killing of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have reignited hostilities in the region. This attack was followed by the launching of missiles by Hezbollah onto Israel. Hezbollah claimed that their attack was in retaliation for the killing of the Iranian Supreme Leader, in defence of Lebanon and its people, and in response to the repeated Israeli aggressions (here). In the aftermath of these events, Israel issued evacuation orders to dozens of villages in southern Lebanon and to the southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah in turn, issued evacuation orders to residents of Israeli towns situated within five kilometres of the border (here).
The purpose of this article is to assess the legality of Israeli evacuation orders in Lebanon, including whether such orders may amount to forced displacement as a war crime, given their significant impact on the civilian population. The author believes that the rules on forcible transfer and deportation (as per Article 49 of the Geneva Convention IV) are inapplicable, as there is no case of occupation. Rules concerning proportionality in attacks are inapplicable too, as those would only apply in relation to incidental civilian harm caused in the context of an ‘armed attack’; and, evacuation orders do not constitute armed attacks. Furthermore, for reasons of brevity, this article does not examine the classification of conflicts, that is, whether the conflict is as an international or a non-international one (IAC or NIAC). This issue has been examined in a previous work in which I argue that the situation should be characterised as involving two parallel armed conflicts: an international armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon, and a non-international armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (see further here).
Legal basis underpinning evacuation orders
The legality of evacuation orders may be assessed under two related legal frameworks: the rules governing precautions in attack and the rules regulating the displacement of civilians. In certain circumstances, these frameworks may overlap, particularly where evacuation orders are accompanied by coercive threats directed at the civilian population.
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I (API) (related to IACs) states that ‘constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects’, and that ‘effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit’. This article is also reflected in rules 15 and 20 of the ICRC customary law study which applies to NIACs. The point to be said here is that warnings before attacks are sometimes obligatory, and failing to provide a warning could be a violation of Article 57 of API and relevant customary rules. In addition, Article 17 of Additional Protocol II (APII) which reflects customary rule 129.B, as well as article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court state that the displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. The unlawful ordering of such displacement would constitute a war crime. When read together, the rules on advance warnings under Article 57 API (and relevant customary rules) and the prohibition on displacement under Article 17 APII (and article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute) indicate that the removal of civilians from their homes is an exceptional measure, permissible only where required by the security of civilians or by imperative military reasons.
In addition, to assess whether evacuation orders amount to unlawful forced displacement, we must determine whether residents were coerced to evacuate. In Prosecutor v Stakić, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY explains that forcible displacement occurs when civilians leave because of coercion or a coercive environment, even if there is no direct physical force (para 279). Although many civilians left on buses or convoys, the Chamber concluded that they had no genuine choice to remain, which amounts to either deportation or forcible transfer (see paras 314, 318, 334, 316, and 317). This was a case of forcible transfer under GC IV (as opposed to the war crime of displacement), however, the point to be drawn here is that the displacement of a population does not have to be the result of a physical force. A threat of the use of force may lead to forced displacement. This logic had also been adopted by the ICRC (here paras 3170, 3171, and 3172) and clarified by the ICTY in Krstic which considered that ‘forcible’ is not restricted to physical force, and may include threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression (para 529).
In addition, Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I (API), as well as article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II (APII), prohibit any acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population. With that said, evacuation orders followed by threats may raise concerns under Articles 51(2) and 13(2) of API and APII.
Furthermore, the ICRC considered that evacuation orders cannot be issued for military convenience or advantage, rather, they must be materially indispensable for military operations (here). The commentary considers evacuation to be an extreme measure, and accordingly, it is only lawful in ‘the gravest of circumstances and only as measures of last resort’ (here).
Evacuation orders are not unlawful per se, and are sometimes mandatory for the protection of the civilian population. For example, where a military objective such as a weapons depot is located in a populated area, warnings or evacuation measures may be necessary to reduce civilian harm. However, when these orders are issued on a large scale, they may raise the issue of necessity, that is, whether these evacuation orders were necessary for the purpose of the relevant kinetic attack.
Legality of Israel’s evacuation orders
The legality of these evacuation orders will be examined in two parts. First, by proving that there is an intention to coerce and punish the civilian population, as well as to exercise political and military pressure on Hezbollah and the Lebanese government; and second, by showing that these evacuation orders were not necessary, that is, not for military imperatives but rather for military convenience.
First, Israel’s evacuation orders were followed with statements which may be interpreted as suggesting or implying the inflicting of damage and/or destruction of a civilian population. For example, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich (member of the security cabinet), in one statement, declared that Dahiyeh (southern suburbs of Beirut) will look like Khan Younis; he said,
…we gave instructions to all residents of Dahiyeh to evacuate. You wanted to bring hell on us, you brought hell on yourselves. Dahiyeh will look like Khan Younis. Our northern residents will live in peace, quiet, and security (here and here).
This statement was made hours after Israeli evacuation orders of southern Beirut were issued (here). One should note that the southern suburb of Beirut is a very populated area located 85 km from the Israeli-Lebanese border; and that no missile or armed attack has ever (or at least in the current military conflict) been launched or conducted from that area. Another statement by an Israeli official to The Times of Israel on 12 March 2026 states, ‘the Lebanese government needs to get a grip on their country or Hezbollah parts of Beirut will soon look like Gaza’ (here). On 13 March 2026, Israel defence minister Israel Katz stated that the Lebanese government had ‘misled and failed to uphold its commitment to disarm Hezbollah’, warning that it will ‘therefore pay a price until it fulfils that obligation’ (here and here). Israel’s defence minister said that ‘this is only the beginning, and the Lebanese government and the Lebanese state will pay an increasing price through damage to Lebanese national infrastructure that is used by Hezbollah terrorists’, a statement that appears to lay the groundwork for strikes against state and civilian infrastructure.
These statements are growing indications that the threat of large-scale destruction directed at the South of Lebanon and Beirut is being articulated as a coercive strategy. In fact, Amnesty International has reported on the extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure carried out by the IDF, before and after the ceasefire with Lebanon (here). According to Amnesty International, civilian property and land, including more than 10,000 structures, were destroyed within a period of four months after the ceasefire agreement (here and here). It appears that references made by Israeli officials to past atrocities function as implicit warnings, transforming the spectre of mass violence into a form of strategic leverage. In this framing, extreme violence risks being normalised as precedent rather than treated as an absolute legal prohibition. These evacuation orders have caused massive chaos and suffering to the civilian population (here and here). Lebanese civilians are thereby positioned as instruments of pressure. This shows a clear coercive measure aimed at displacing civilians before destruction has materialised, using what seems to be a threat of illegal use of force, that is, the destruction of certain areas to meet a similar fate as Gaza. This appears to be a clear violation of Articles 51(2) and 13(2) of Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II (respectively) which prohibit any acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.
Second, the legality of these evacuation orders is questioned when they are made in large scale and when military advantage can be achieved in alternative ways. While an argument may be made to justify evacuation orders in border villages, it is difficult to see why such orders would be issued for an area located 85 km from the border (southern suburbs of Beirut); or even villages beyond the Litani river (beyond 20 km) or even border villages where no actual fighting will occur.
Blanket evacuation orders may be unlawful when they are unnecessary for achieving a concrete military objective. For example, when the intended target is a single apartment within a residential building, it would be difficult to justify ordering the evacuation of an entire neighbourhood. Such a measure would go far beyond what is required to address the specific target and could instead create unnecessary disruption and pressure on the civilian population. Such operations could be conducted with targeted missiles, and any evacuation warning in this instance would risk losing the military advantage.
The same reasoning applies where the objective is a weapons depot within a populated area. When a depot is located in a busy area, a warning must be given to those in the vicinity of that depot to leave their houses and come back the next day. This would still allow civilians to take precautions without imposing large-scale displacement, and it would not meaningfully undermine the military operation, particularly where the target, such as a weapons depot, cannot realistically be relocated within a short period of time. Displacing tens of thousands of residents for an unlimited period of time seems to be unnecessary in this instance.
This reasoning is reinforced when considering the targeting of individual military combatants. In such cases, the IDF is not and has never issued any warnings or evacuation orders; the operation proceeds without prior notice. For example, on 7 March 2026, a room in the Ramada Hotel in central Beirut was reportedly struck with precision missiles after it was said to contain four Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps combatants (here and here). The IDF did not give any warning, as in such a situation, issuing a warning would likely have allowed the combatants to flee, thereby creating a concrete military disadvantage. Instead, a targeted strike was carried out, suggesting that the operation sought to comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality. If military forces are lawfully targeting combatants without evacuating surrounding populations, it is difficult to understand why large-scale evacuation orders affecting hundreds of thousands of civilians would be necessary in other instances, especially, when it seems that areas such as the southern suburbs of Beirut and the area between the Litani and Zahrani river have not so far witnessed any direct ground combat. This discrepancy raises serious questions about the necessity of such measures and suggests that they may impose unnecessary fear and disruption on the civilian population. This shows that evacuation orders were issued for military convenience rather than military imperatives.
Thus far, 800,000 people have been displaced in Lebanon, and more than 700 people (at the time of writing) including 98 children have been killed since the beginning of this round of hostilities (here, here and here).
Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, several factors raise serious concerns regarding the legality of these evacuation orders. First, the orders were issued as blanket measures covering vast areas of Lebanon—reportedly exceeding 15% of the country’s territory—and resulted in the displacement of approximately 800,000 civilians. Second, these orders were accompanied by statements from Israeli officials suggesting that the affected areas could face the same fate as Gaza, a location where large-scale destruction and allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law have been widely reported. Third, these statements served as a threat to the civilian population, and fulfilled the element of coercion. Finally, the justification for such large-scale evacuation orders becomes difficult to sustain when the stated objective appears to be the targeting of Hezbollah bases or weapons depots. In such circumstances, a far more limited warning directed at individuals in the immediate vicinity of the target would likely be sufficient. This is further illustrated by the practice adopted when individual combatants are targeted, where operations proceed without evacuation warnings or the displacement of surrounding populations.
Image credit: Tasnim News Agency, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>, via Wikimedia Commons