On 20 February 2026, Ghana, in a press release, formally notified the Government of Togo of its decision to submit their unresolved maritime boundary dispute to arbitration under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (henceforth: 1982 LOSC). After the lapse of almost a decade during which negotiations, joint technical committees and high-level political consultations took place, Accra concluded that diplomatic efforts had reached an impasse. In a statement issued by the Presidency, spokesperson Felix Kwakye Ofosu explained that arbitration was necessary “to avoid an escalation of incidents that have created tensions between some of our institutions and to promote an amicable resolution”.
The response from Togo followed five days later. In a press release dated 25 February 2026, the Togolese Government acknowledged receipt of Ghana’s notification and recognised the existence of a disagreement regarding the delimitation of the common maritime boundary. It recalled that several maritime incidents between November 2016 and May 2018 in the undelimited maritime area had underscored the need for delimitation. While observing that Ghana’s recourse to arbitration signalled a departure from the framework of ongoing bilateral negotiations, the Togolese Government took note of the decision and reaffirmed its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, good neighbourliness and fraternal cooperation in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity embodied in the 1982 LOSC.
This is not Ghana’s first recourse to compulsory international adjudication in the Gulf of Guinea. On 03 December 2014, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire agreed to submit their maritime boundary dispute to a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (henceforth: ITLOS), culminating in the 2017 judgment that delimited their maritime boundary. The present step thus reflects a continuity in Ghana’s preference for third-party dispute resolution under Part XV of the 1982 LOSC.
This note places Ghana’s decision within the broader framework of international law of the sea and African maritime governance. It outlines the historical and legal background, identifies the relevant procedural framework and considers the possible trajectories of the case.
Background to the Case
Ghana and Togo share both land and maritime boundaries. The land boundary can be traced back to Anglo-German colonial arrangements of the late nineteenth century, subsequently adjusted under Franco-British agreements after the First World War and confirmed under League of Nations mandates. Upon attaining independence – Ghana in 1957 and Togo in 1960 – both states affirmed their commitment to the principle of uti possidetis juris, thereby accepting the inviolability of inherited colonial boundaries as a foundational norm of inter-state relations. Concurrently, they endorsed the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, including, inter alia, arbitration, as articulated in Article III (3)-(4) of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (henceforth: OAU). The OAU’s 1964 Cairo Resolution affirmed the inviolability of inherited colonial borders to prevent destabilising territorial revisionism. The successor African Union (henceforth: AU) reaffirmed this dual commitment in its Article 4 (b) and (e) of the 2000 Constitutive Act. The African Union Border Programme (henceforth: AUBP), established in 2007, specifically endorsed those objectives. In its Declaration on the African Union Border Programme, Article 5 (a) urges Member States to delimit and demarcate their boundaries peacefully, primarily through negotiation and other consensual means. A notable example is this regard is the 2009 Accra Pan-African Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the Continental Shelf for the Implementation of the African Union Border Programme. Important work has since been undertaken through reports, technical assistance and direct involvement in boundary processes, including publications such as the “African Border Dispute Settlement: The User’s Guide” (2016). Despite significant efforts to advance peaceful delimitation, maritime boundaries around Africa remain only partially resolved and a substantial number continue to be undelimited or disputed.
The present dispute constitutes one such example of the broader pattern of incomplete maritime delimitation. The immediate origins of the Ghana-Togo dispute lie in Togo’s reported rejection in 2016 of what Ghana considers a long-standing customary maritime alignment extending the land boundary seaward along an equidistance trajectory. Togo advanced an alternative orientation that shifted the line, thereby creating an area of overlapping claims affecting the extension of Ghana’s offshore domain, including parts of the suspected resource-rich Keta Basin. Tensions further intensified in late 2017-early 2018 when Togolese authorities reportedly intervened to halt Ghanaian seismic survey vessels operating in maritime areas subject to overlapping claims by both states.
In response, the two States established a Joint Maritime Boundary Technical Committee composed of hydrographers, legal experts and diplomats. Negotiations alternated between Accra and Lomé and were twice elevated to presidential level, involving former President Nana Akufo-Addo and President Faure Gnassingbé. In 2018, both sides publicly committed to pursuing a maritime boundary treaty and agreed on provisional arrangements pending final delimitation, consistent with Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the 1982 LOSC. Discussions reportedly advanced significantly in 2021, when a delimitation agreement appeared imminent. Nevertheless, no final settlement materialised.
The Legal Framework
Both Ghana and Togo are parties to the 1982 LOSC, with Ghana ratifying in 1983 and Togo in 1985, which provides the substantive and procedural framework for maritime delimitation and dispute settlement. Articles 74 and 83 require States with adjacent coasts to achieve delimitation by agreement in order to reach an equitable solution. Pending agreement, they must make every effort not to jeopardise or hamper the conclusion of a final arrangement. This approach has been confirmed in earlier case law involving Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire before ITLOS (paras. 629-630).
The procedural framework is governed primarily by Part XV of the 1982 LOSC. Article 279 reaffirms the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means, while Article 287 (2) allows States to choose among four procedures: ITLOS, the International Court of Justice, arbitration under Annex VII and special arbitration under Annex VIII. In the absence of matching declarations, Annex VII arbitration applies by default (Article 287 (3)). Article 298 permits states to exclude certain categories of disputes, including maritime delimitation, from compulsory procedures. Ghana withdrew its Article 298 declaration on 22 September 2014, thereby accepting compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions for maritime delimitation disputes. This development is consistent with Ghana’s prior posture in favour of judicial settlement, as reflected in its decision to resolve its maritime dispute with Côte d’Ivoire through adjudication. It also aligns with other African practice that had recourse to arbitration such as the 1985 Case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Togo, by contrast, entered an Article 298 declaration on 12 April 2019 excluding disputes in which the United Nations (henceforth: UN) Security Council is exercising its functions and military activities.
At the domestic level, Togo’s 1977 Ordinance No. 24 delimiting the Territorial Waters and Creating a Protected Economic Maritime Zone established territorial waters and a protected economic maritime zone (Articles 1 and 2). This was later updated by 2016 Act No. 2016-007 concerning Maritime Areas under National Jurisdiction which explicitly incorporates 1982 UNCLOS precepts and defines the breadth of Togo’s Territorial Sea (henceforth: TS), Contiguous Zone (henceforth: CZ), Exclusive Economic Zone (henceforth: EEZ) (Articles 2-3 and 5). Interestingly, Article 7 of the same instrument provides that the delimitation of maritime boundaries is to be carried out in accordance with Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the 1982 LOSC. On 07 October 2020, Togo deposited with the UN lists of geographical coordinates for its baselines and outer limits pursuant to Articles 16 (2) and 75 (2) of the 1982 LOSC. It is also worth noting that, in September 2018, a Joint Submission was prepared by the Republic of Benin and the Togolese Republic concerning the delineation of the Continental Shelf (henceforth: CS) beyond 200 nautical miles. Originally established in 2014 pursuant to specific legislation, the Maritime Borders Commission of Togo underwent institutional restructuring in 2025, resulting in its integration into a unified framework mandated to address both land and maritime boundary disputes.
On the Ghanaian side, the country’s Maritime Zones (Delimitation) Law (1986) defines the TS, CZ, EEZ and CS (Articles 1, 4-6). In 2010, the country enacted legislation establishing the Ghana Boundary Commission, with the aim, inter alia, of delimiting the State’s land and maritime boundaries (Article 2 (a)). On 09 July 2018, Ghana deposited with the UN coordinates concerning its maritime boundary with Côte d’Ivoire following the ITLOS 2017 judgment. Additionally, Article 257 (6) of the 1992 Constitution provides that “[e]very mineral in its natural state” is the property of the Republic of Ghana. This constitutional vesting of ownership extends beyond the terrestrial domain to encompass mineral resources located within Ghana’s EEZ and CS, thereby affirming the State’s sovereign rights over natural resources situated both on land and within its maritime jurisdiction.
What’s Next?
With proceedings at an incipient stage, several scenarios remain conceivable. In its press release of 25 February 2026, Togo took note of Ghana’s notification and, rather than rejecting the initiative, reaffirmed its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, good neighbourliness and fraternal cooperation in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity enshrined in the 1982 LOSC. Although Togo observed that recourse to arbitration signalled a departure from the framework of ongoing bilateral negotiations, its statement did not contest the lawfulness of the procedure. On the contrary, it underscored adherence to the Convention and the shared legal instruments binding upon both States.
In this light, it is likely that Togo will participate in the Annex VII arbitration, either without reservation or while raising preliminary objections relating to jurisdiction or admissibility. Any such objections would need to be assessed against the scope of Togo’s Article 298 declaration, which excludes disputes involving Security Council functions and military activities, but does not exclude maritime delimitation per se. Moreover, Article 7 of Togo’s 2016 legislation expressly provides that delimitation shall be effected in accordance with Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the 1982 LOSC, a provision that may reinforce the tribunal’s jurisdictional foundation.
Arbitration does not preclude the continuation of negotiations. As emphasised by ITLOS in the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire judgment (paras. 629-630), provisional arrangements remain available pending final delimitation. Arbitration may, in this respect, operate not merely as an adjudicatory mechanism but also as a catalyst for renewed diplomatic engagement, potentially encouraging compromise or even the establishment of a joint development agreement in areas of overlapping claims. Joint development zones have precedent within the region, including arrangements between São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria. Such mechanisms enable exploration and exploitation of resources without prejudice to the parties’ respective legal positions, in conformity with Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the 1982 LOSC.
At a systemic level, the present episode underscores the centrality of Part XV of the 1982 LOSC in structuring maritime governance in West Africa. It reflects a broader regional shift toward formalised delimitation and reliance on binding legal mechanisms rather than indefinite negotiation. While arbitration promises legal clarity and finality, it simultaneously tests the political resilience of the parties. The durability and effectiveness of any process will ultimately depend upon sustained good faith and engagement. Whether this will be achieved in the present case remains to be seen.