On 10 December 2025, the Security Council once again debated the future of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). As in previous sessions, delegations diverged sharply in their assessments of the tribunal: France, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea underscored the importance of retaining international authority over things like sentence enforcement and early release, while the Russian Federation decried the court’s $60 million budget amidst what it described as “a completely empty judicial basket.”

Yet beneath these disagreements lay a point of consensus. Almost all delegations signalled tacit support for winding up the IRMCT and transferring its remaining functions to “competent national authorities.”

The IRMCT is likely to cease operations in the near future. Its closure will mark the formal end of the ad hoc tribunal era of international criminal justice. For many observers, the IRMCT has long appeared as less of a living institution and more as an administrative afterthought to the dramatic legacies of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It is, after all, only tasked with performing these tribunals’ “residual” functions.

What this narrative obscures, however, is that the IRMCT continues to exercise decisive control over human lives. For over 15 years, eight men — indicted by the ICTR but either fully acquitted or released after completing their sentences — have remained trapped in legal and humanitarian limbo as a direct consequence of the IRMCT’s failure to secure their safe relocation. Known as the “Stateless Eight,” these men depend entirely on the IRMCT for protection, legal status, documentation, medical care, and any prospect of a meaningful future.

The IRMCT’s recent attempt to resolve their situation by relocating them to Niger was a foreseeable disaster. Since December 2021, the surviving men have been confined to a house in Niamey, without legal status or freedom of movement and wholly dependent on the IRMCT to fulfill their necessities of life. Three of these men have died in these conditions. Far from an bureaucratic formality, the IRMCT is the institution that wields decisive authority over whether these men will live the remainder of their lives in safety and dignity, or continue to endure violations that international law recognises as among the most serious human rights abuses in existence.

This article contends that, in respect of the Stateless Eight, the United Nations, acting through the IRMCT as its subsidiary organ, has assumed human rights obligations under general international law. By effectively and decisively controlling their legal status, access to basic necessities, and prospects for safe relocation, the United Nations bears, through the conduct of the IRMCT, binding obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil these men’s fundamental rights — obligations which are intensified by the dire circumstances in which these men now live. Until it secures the safe relocation and family reunification for each of the surviving Stateless Eight, any move to shutter the IRMCT is not only premature, but legally untenable and morally indefensible.

The History of the IRMCT and the Situation of the “Stateless Eight”

Established in 2010 by Security Council Resolution 1966, the IRMCT assumed responsibility for the ICTR’s residual functions at a time when several of the men who would later become the Stateless Eight were already living under UN protection in Arusha, as their return to Rwanda would have violated the principle of non-refoulement (see Irving).

Yet, for reasons which remain unclear, their situation was not addressed during the IRMCT’s establishment. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report focused on administrative and operational matters — including the trial of fugitives, sentence enforcement, assistance to national authorities, and archive management — but made no provision for acquitted or released individuals remaining in ICTR custody. The IRMCT’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence reflect this apparent oversight.

When the IRMCT assumed responsibility for these individuals, the status quo established by the ICTR was maintained. They remained in Arusha, even as the President of the IRMCT acknowledged that their prolonged limbo “gravely affects their rights.”

On 15 November 2021, the IRMCT concluded a relocation agreement with Niger. The eight men consented to this relocation, on the belief that this arrangement would finally allow them to rebuild their lives in freedom and dignity. The men were transferred to Niger in early December, but within days the arrangement collapsed: their identity cards were withdrawn, armed police surrounded their residence, and expulsion orders were issued. Although the Duty Judge twice ordered Niger to suspend the expulsions and directed the Registrar to arrange the men’s immediate return to Arusha “forthwith”, the Registrar did not comply.

Since December 2021, the Stateless Eight have been subjected to unlawful house arrest in Niamey. They continue to live without legal status, travel documents, or adequate medical care. Three of the men have died in these conditions: Tharcisse Muvunyi (2023), Anatole Nsengiyumva (2024), and Protais Zigiranyirazo (2025). Throughout this period, the IRMCT has continued to report to the Security Council that it is seeking “a durable solution” to the situation faced by the surviving men, while taking no meaningful steps to safely relocate them or restore to them full UN protection.

The story of the Stateless Eight — from protracted limbo in Arusha to confinement and constant insecurity in Niamey — makes clear that the IRMCT’s role is far more than procedural or symbolic. By exercising decisive control over their legal status, access to basic necessities, and prospects for relocation, the IRMCT has assumed human rights obligations which demand urgent and positive action.

The IRMCT’s Human Rights Obligations

The IRMCT is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and thus forms part of the institutional structure of the United Nations. While subsidiary organs may not necessarily possess independent international legal personality distinct from the organisation that establishes them, their acts and omissions are attributable to that organisation under general international law (for an analysis of attribution in respect of the ad hoc tribunals, see Sluiter at p. 624-628). Accordingly, where the IRMCT exercises authority over individuals, any responsibility arising under international law is borne by the United Nations.

As affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the WHO-Egypt Advisory Opinion, international organisations, like the Security Council and its subsidiaries, “are subjects of international law, and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law” — in other words, by customary international law and general principles of law (see Clapham). Under general international law, the existence of jurisdiction over human rights follows the factual exercise of public power over individuals by a subject of international law (see Berkes). While the test of “effective authority or control” has been developed and critiqued more fully in relation to the acts of UN peacekeeping operations (see Okada, Ryngaert), it reflects a commonsense principle: where an entity exercises power over persons in a manner that is decisive for the enjoyment of their rights, international law attaches responsibility to that exercise of power, particularly where no meaningful alternative protective regime exists.

Further, core human rights norms — most obviously, the rights to life, to be free from torture or degrading treatment, and to be free from arbitrary detention — are jus cogens norms and form part of customary international law (see Schabas). The obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil these rights bind international organisations when and to the extent that they exercise jurisdiction over individuals.

The United Nations, acting through the IRMCT, exercises decisive and exclusive control over all critical aspects of the lives of the Stateless Eight. It alone determines their legal status, authorises or withholds travel and identity documentation, controls access to medical care and evacuation, manages their subsistence, and directs — or fails to direct — efforts toward their safe relocation. This control is determinative of the men’s life, liberty, physical and mental integrity, access to health care, and right to family life.

Such circumstances give rise to a “special relationship of dependency” sufficient to trigger jurisdiction under general international law and to engage the human rights obligations of a subject of international law. Where an international organisation exercises exclusive and decisive authority over individuals and thereby controls whether and how their fundamental rights may be enjoyed, jurisdiction and obligations follow. To conclude otherwise would be to accept the absurd proposition that an international organisation may wield total power over individuals while remaining legally unaccountable.

The IRMCT’s own practice affirms this conclusion. The ICTR previously acknowledged that it bore responsibility for the welfare of acquitted persons who remained under its authority, and that understanding has continued under the IRMCT. In May 2022, the Appeals Chamber noted that:

“while the Mechanism’s duty of care towards acquitted or released persons does not continue indefinitely following their relocation, in the particular circumstance of the present case, where the relocation appears not to have been carried out in accordance with the full terms of the [Niger Agreement] … the duty of care continues.”

This reflects the IRMCT’s own recognition that its control over the men gives rise to legal responsibility for their safety and well-being under applicable norms of international law.

Moreover, the IRMCT’s human rights obligations toward the surviving men are intensified in their positive and protective dimensions by the absence of effective protection from either the Stateless Eight’s state of nationality (Rwanda) or the host state (Niger).

In the first instance, if any of the surviving men were returned to Rwanda, they would face a grave and foreseeable risks to their life and liberty. The Rwandan government has consistently demonstrated an intolerance for political opposition, particularly toward individuals associated with or perceived to be connected to pre-1994 political institutions. The IRMCT’s decision to provide each of the Stateless Eight with UN protection in Arusha following their acquittals or release clearly illustrates that their state of nationality cannot reasonably be expected to afford them effective protection of their fundamental rights.

In the second instance, the 2023 coup d’état in Niger and the subsequent withdrawal of international assistance has significantly eroded that country’s capacity to provide basic human rights protections. Where the authority of a state is disrupted and fundamental rights cannot be secured through ordinary mechanisms, the entity exercising effective control over the individuals concerned — here, the UN, through the conduct of the IRMCT — bears an even greater obligation to be proactive so that the human rights of those fully dependent on it are upheld.

Taken together, the IRMCT’s decisive control over the lives of the Stateless Eight, coupled with the absence of effective protection from either their state of nationality or the host state, establishes its jurisdiction as a human rights duty-bearer. International law requires it take active measures to ensure that the men’s fundamental rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled.

Conclusion

In accordance with its human rights obligations, the IRMCT must guarantee that the surviving Stateless Eight are relocated safely to a third country and reunited with their families. This is the minimum required to end the prolonged violations to their rights and restore their ability to live with dignity. Were the IRMCT finally secure such an outcome in cooperation with states, the winding up of the tribunal would raise no principled objection.

What cannot be justified is the dissolution of the IRMCT while the surviving men remain trapped in legal and humanitarian limbo, wholly dependent on an institution that alone controls the means of resolving their situation. In these circumstances, repeated invocations of “complementarity” by Security Council delegates are divorced from reality. Complementarity presupposes the existence of willing and capable states. In respect of the Stateless Eight, none have proactively assumed responsibility for the men’s protection, relocation, or basic security.

Shuttering the IRMCT under these circumstances would not mark the orderly completion of its mandate. It would amount to a collective abdication of responsibility, entrench ongoing human rights violations, and send a deeply troubling message: that international justice mechanisms can wield total power over individuals, create absolute dependency, and then walk away without securing a lawful and lasting solution. International law forbids such an outcome, and the credibility of international criminal justice depends on ensuring it never happens.