On 17 December 2025, “as part of the ongoing review of its procedures and working methods”, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’ or ‘Court’) amended article 78 of the Rules of Court to make available to the public reports provided by the parties concerning compliance with provisional measures (‘provisional measures reports’ or ‘reports’).

Article 78, which previously stipulated that “[t]he Court may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any provisional measures it has indicated”, will, as of 2 February 2026, read as follows:

“1. The Court may request that the parties shall submit reports to it on measures they have taken to give effect to an Order indicating provisional measures, within a time-limit specified by the Court. The Court may also request information on other matters connected with any provisional measure it has indicated.

2. Where the Court requests the submission of a report pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall, after ascertaining the views of the parties, make the report or parts thereof accessible to the public as soon as possible, unless, in case of an objection by a party, it decides otherwise.”

After briefly sketching the changes this represents to the Court’s regulatory framework in respect of provisional measures, the present blog post discusses some possible challenges that the Court may have to navigate in this regard.

On its face, this amendment involves two changes: (i) that the Court may request reports on provisional measures; and (ii) that it shall, as a general rule, make the report or parts thereof accessible to the public as soon as possible.

In fact, the first point merely codifies existing practice. By use of language that drew on article 78 as it then applied, and without specifically referring to a report, the Court has indicated that parties are to inform the Court of their compliance with provisional measures (e.g. Paraguay v United States of America, Order of 9 April 1998; Mexico v United States, Orders of 5 February 2003 and 16 July 2008; Georgia v Russian Federation, Order of 15 October 2008; Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Order of 8 March 2011; Cambodia v Thailand, Order of 18 July 2011; Costa Rica v Nicaragua and Nicaragua v Costa Rica, Order of 22 November 2013).

In recent years, it has not been uncommon for the Court to require a party to “submit a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect” to provisional measures ordered against it (e.g. Armenia v Azerbaijan, Order of 17 November 2023; South Africa v Israel, Orders of 26 January 2024; 28 March 2024; and 24 May 2024). On some occasions, the Court even ordered a periodic reporting requirement (e.g. Gambia v Myanmar, Order of 23 January 2020; see also Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Order of 22 November 2013, using the previous terminology of provision of information).  

It is the second point—the provision that, as a general rule, the Court shall make the report or parts thereof public as soon as possible—that involves a substantive change departing from current practice. Indeed, to date, the Court has not made public any provisional measures reports by states, despite having requested information in some form on compliance with provisional measures on numerous occasions, and notwithstanding that at least some of the relevant cases have since concluded. By comparison, moreover, with Article 53(2) of the Rules of Court (pursuant to which pleadings of parties “may” be made publicly accessible “on or after the opening of the oral proceedings”), the new Article 78(2) mandates publicization and imports a sense of immediacy to this requirement. The wording suggests that these reports will, in practice, generally be made public well before the merits of the case are heard. 

At a time when compliance with provisional measures appears patchy at best (see e.g. Costa Rica v Nicaragua and Nicaragua v Costa Rica, Judgment of 16 December 2015, para. 127; Ukraine v Russian Federation, Judgment of 31 January 2024, paras. 392 and 398), it might be argued that making reports publicly accessible will generate greater accountability (see e.g. here on the benefits of making such reports public, including the enhancement of compliance, transparency and the rule of law). By having to make public the steps it has taken to give effect to provisional measures ordered, it might be thought that a state will be more inclined to comply with such measures. The public attention that such reports can be expected to generate, as well as scrutiny by members of civil society and possibly other states, may serve as an incentive for compliance. These reports could also be relied upon by other international bodies, such as international investigative mechanisms, fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry, and perhaps even courts and tribunals in other proceedings.

At the same time, this general requirement of publicity without delay may have unintended consequences, depending also on how the Court navigates objections to the making of such reports public and how it applies the “as soon as possible” requirement.

On the one hand, it could impact the decision of states on whether to comply with the reporting requirement, as they might be unwilling to have sensitive or other information about ongoing matters publicized, there being no guarantee that the Court will adhere to any objection concerning non-publicization. Further, where the underlying dispute attracts particular public and political attention, the additional spotlight on the state’s conduct that can be expected to follow the publicization of reports—and even more so where there is a periodic reporting requirement—may further discourage compliance, particularly where a state’s breach of its international legal obligations is more than arguable. This is more than a hypothetical possibility, especially when the full participation of states in proceedings before the Court is not a given (e.g. Canada and the Netherlands v Syria, Order of 16 November 2023, para. 11; Guyana v Venezuela, Order of 1 May 2025, paras. 17-19). In turn, the failure of a state to comply with any reporting requirement—itself a breach of the state’s international legal obligations—may well limit the information on which the Court can rely to reach any view on compliance with provisional measures.

On the other hand, insofar as states do comply with any reporting requirement, they can be expected to act in the knowledge that reports will likely be made public. Making strategic use of this, they may be inclined to frame or reinforce a certain narrative of the facts, their actions, and even the Court’s approach to the matter. Indeed, such reports cannot be expected to be neutral expositions. Rather, they are part of the state’s litigation strategy and overall approach to the issues at hand; and with the publicization of the reports, there will be an additional audience that states are likely to consider.

Moreover, the absence of an express provision envisaging a response by any other party to the case, let alone the public disclosure of such a response, might also skew the balance between the parties (at least in public perception) and impact in some sense the adversarial nature of the proceedings. It is, after all, the rights that are the subject-matter of the dispute that provisional measures are principally intended to protect (e.g. United States v Iran, Order of 15 December 1979, para. 36).

Furthermore, the prescriptive “shall”, rather than a discretionary “may”, coupled with the limited exception for non-publicization necessitating a prior “objection by a party”, on its face leaves little scope for the Court to decide proprio motu not to publicize a particular report in other circumstances, for example because such report implicates some third party.

Additionally, making the reports available to the world at large, and thus enabling other actors to make their own assessments on a state’s compliance with provisional measures before the Court has had an opportunity to adjudicate the merits of a dispute, might not be conducive to the sound administration of justice by the Court. Such premature assessments of the case could exacerbate international tensions, while also lending themselves to external expectations and to perceived indirect pressure on the judicial proceedings. There is good reason why the written pleadings are made available “on or after the opening of the oral proceedings”. The requirement to publicize reports as soon as possible is even more striking considering the open question whether the Court may and will adjudicate on compliance with provisional measures in cases where it ultimately finds that it lacks jurisdiction or that a case is inadmissible. In these ways, publicizing reports may be of no service to the judicial process or to resolving the underlying dispute.

Beyond concerns specific to compliance with reporting requirements, the Court’s decisions to impose periodic reporting requirements, the frequency with which the Court has recently been called on to modify or indicate new provisional measures (e.g. twice in Armenia v Azerbaijan; twice in South Africa v Israel; and once in Guyana v Venezuela), and the Court’s ad hoc committees that monitor the implementation of provisional measures (Resolution concerning Internal Judicial Practice, Article 11(i)) all reflect the Court’s greater involvement in the regulation of live (often militarised) disputes. The amended Article 78 further contributes to this, or at least adds a public dimension to it, possibly reinforcing expectations that the Court can effectively regulate such disputes, despite real questions as to whether the Court is institutionally well-suited to do so.

In conclusion, as the Court continues to navigate its contemporary role and the considerable hopes that some states place on it, the Court’s careful balancing between the protection of sensitive information and the drive for transparency is crucial for the maintenance of states’ trust and effectiveness of the Court’s procedures. It may be that the reporting requirement has mainly positive consequences, demonstrating the Court’s role as a successful and transparent adjudicator of intractable conflicts on the world stage. In any event, considering that these reports (or parts thereof) would be made public only after hearing the parties’ views on the matter, one might hope that the Court would tread with caution in achieving the right balance.

The views of the authors are expressed in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the position of any institution or organization with which they are or have been affiliated.