Rob Mullins (The University of Queensland – T.C. Beirne School of Law) has posted Lesser Evils, Mere Permissions and Justifying Reasons in Law (New Essays on the Nature of Legal Reasoning (James Penner and Mark McBride, eds., Hart Publishing, 2022)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This chapter is a study of justificatory reasoning in law. I focus on ‘lesser evils’ defences, which many theorists claim are the paradigmatic case of justificatory reasoning in law. Some justifying reasons seem to generate permissions, rather than requirements. There are cases were we are permitted, but not required, to perform a justified act. It is difficult to offer a reason-based account of lesser evils justifications that does not collapse the distinction between the required and the permissible with respect to justified conduct. I will consider several prominent responses to the problem. I conclude by suggesting that none of these responses is adequate without the further stipulation that some reasons lack deontic or requiring force.
Very interesting and recommended.