Section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) imposes liability on those who abuse the DMCA’s notice and take-down procedures by making knowingly false claims of copyright infringement. Courts have issued sanctions on overly zealous copyright owners based on this provision, such as in the case of a voting technology firm that knowingly issued meritless notices of infringement to ISPs. Courts tend to apply Section 512(f) fairly narrowly, however, as illustrated in a recent Central District of California case, Rock River Communications, Inc. v. Universal Music Group, Inc.
Plaintiff Rock River is a producer and distributor of music records. In 2006, Rock River remixed recordings of reggae music by Bob Marley and the Wailers, purportedly under license from a company called San Juan Music. Defendant Universal Music Group (“UMG”) is the owner of Island Records and controls the rights to a number of Bob Marley’s records. In October 2007, UMG sent cease and desist letters to various Internet music distributors, including Apple, asserting that it had exclusive rights to the Bob Marley recordings and threatening copyright infringement actions. As a result, the distributors stopped distributing Rock River’s remixes. Rock River then sued, asserting a number of claims, including that UMG violated Section 512(f) of the DMCA by sending a cease and desist letter to Apple that contained knowing and material misrepresentations that Rock River’s remixes infringed UMG’s copyright.
The court held that Section 512(f) of the DMCA did not apply because the “notification” at issue—the cease and desist letter to Apple—was not a notification pursuant to the DMCA. Section 512(c)(1) of the DMCA provides a safe harbor for online service providers with respect to liability “for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” UMG’s cease and desist letter was found not to be a take-down letter as described in Section 512(c) because it did not address infringement by reason of the storage at the direction of a user. Rather, the alleged infringing conduct at issue concerned Apple’s own actions with respect to the selection and distribution of music through its iTunes services, not the performance of the user-directed functions contemplated by the DMCA. Therefore, the court held that UMG’s cease and desist letter was not the functional equivalent of a Section 512(c)(3) takedown notice and, accordingly, was not subject to sanctions under Section 512(f) of the DMCA.