The Bill announced in the King’s Speech on 13 May 2026 has now been published and is beginning its slow passage through Parliament. It is the fifth immigration-related Act across five sessions of Parliament, no less. It seeks to fulfil the commitments made in the White Paper a year prior, including draconian new measures to penalise refugees and asylum seekers.
To try and help make sense of it, Free Movement have created an online Bill Tracker app that shows tracked changes on amended versions of other laws that will be affected by the new Bill. The official explanatory notes (the government’s own version of what the clauses of the Bill are supposed to accomplish) are woven through it and it will be kept up to date with amendments and new versions.
So what does it entail? Here are some non-exhaustive highlights.
Independent Immigration Appeals Authority
Part 1 of the Bill establishes the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA), a new and (allegedly) improved version of the First-tier Tribunal that will be responsible for hearing most asylum and human rights appeals plus some miscellaneous others. This will be situated within the Home Office but will ostensibly be independent of it.
Controversially, adjudicators in the new appeals body will not need to be qualified lawyers, as is currently the case.
Appellants will retain the ability to apply for permission to appeal any decision of the new authority to the Upper Tribunal if there has been an error of law.
The Bill gives the Secretary of State power to impose time limits on the authority:
‘(8)(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations setting out the time period within which the IIAA must—
(a) decide an appeal or bail application, or
(b) take any other steps in proceedings.’
It is not clear whether this will only apply to the period in which the authority will have to promulgate a decision, in which case it would be a good thing, or if this will also apply to other parts of proceedings such as the period of time the appellant has to provide a statement of their case and their evidence, which would not be a good thing.
Given that there is provision for an application to be made to extend the time by either party, the latter seems more likely. There are also provisions for cases to be expedited but only following an application by the Secretary of State (and only if it would be reasonably practicable and in the interests of justice).
Clause 10 contains a provision for making a wasted costs order where the money raised goes to the authority instead of the other party, which then goes towards the Consolidated Fund.
‘Claim notice’
Clause 11 creates a new procedure for notifying the Home Office if there is a reason you should not be removed or deported:
‘(2) A claim notice is a notice requiring its recipient to provide to the Secretary of State and any other competent authority specified in the notice—
(a) any reasons they have for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,
(b) any grounds on which they should be permitted to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,
(c) any grounds on which they should not be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom,
(d) any relevant status information, and
(e) any evidence in support of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d).’
This will certainly feel familiar to immigration lawyers but this is, in fact, distinct from a section 120 notice:
‘(6) When a claim notice is served on a person who has previously been served with a notice under section 120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (requirement to provide reasons and grounds), the notice under section 120 ceases to have effect.’
Failure to disclose a relevant matter at an earlier stage can be taken as damaging credibility and more (see below).
Sponsor claims
Clause 17 amends the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to create a new procedure for family members of British or settled people in the UK. Under this procedure, the application is lodged by the UK-born sponsor with the effect that either party can appeal against a refusal of the claim:
‘(1A) But where such an appeal relates to a sponsor human rights claim, it is instead to be treated as including an appeal against any decision relating to the family member seeking entry into the United Kingdom in respect of which either that family member or the person who made the sponsor human rights claim has a right of appeal under section 82(1).’
Family and private life (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights)
Part 5A of the 2002 Act is being amended as well in an attempt to further erode applicants’ Article 8 rights by purporting to ‘define and codify the concept of “family life”‘.
The new section 117AA will, in a familiar manner, provide a list of considerations that a tribunal should have regard to. This includes provisions stipulating that family life will normally only be engaged between spouses as well as parents and minor children. With respect to other relationships:
‘(4) An adult, A, does not normally have a family life for the purposes of Article 8 with another adult, B, unless—
(a) A and B live together as spouses, civil partners or partners, or
(b) the circumstances are such that there is an additional element of dependency (beyond normal emotional ties) as between A and B.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), the following factors, when taken independently, do not constitute an additional element of dependency as between a person, A, and another person, B—
(a) the fact that A is financially dependent on B;
(b) the fact that A suffers from physical or mental illness or infirmity, unless—
(i) the illness or infirmity means that A is incapacitated to such an extent that A is in need of constant care and support,
(ii) B is (or would be) able to provide that care and support, and
(iii) A would not receive adequate care and support if A were not in the same country as B;
(c) the fact that A relies on B for emotional support;
(d) the fact that A lives in a country affected by war, conflict or instability and as a result B is concerned about A’s welfare.
(6) Nothing in subsection (5) prevents a court or tribunal from considering the factors mentioned in that subsection when determining the public interest question.
(7) In this section, “the public interest question” has the same meaning as in section 117A.’
This perhaps goes slightly further than the current state of case law, though I suppose not that much further than how Article 8 is applied in practice, and will almost certainly be the subject of legal challenges. Clearly, the government thought that the handful of adult dependent relatives who are granted leave on Article 8 grounds every year present such a significant threat to the integrity of the immigration system that they must be legislated against at all costs.
The ‘public interest’ considerations in section 117B are also being amended in clause 19 to expand the definition of financial independence and good character:
‘(2) In subsection (3), for the words from “are financially” to the end substitute “—
(a) are, and are likely to remain, financially independent,
(b) are, and are likely to remain, able to house themselves (and any dependent family members) adequately without reliance on state support, and
(c) are not, and are not likely to become, reliant on public services, in particular health or social care services, in the long-term,” because such persons are not likely to be a burden on taxpayers and are likely to be better able to integrate into society.”
(3) After subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the prevention of disorder or crime, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom—
(a) have not been convicted of a criminal offence (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere),
(b) have co-operated with immigration authorities and processes, and
(c) are otherwise of good character.’“
The provision for according ‘little’ weight to private or family life formed when the appellant was here unlawfully is being amended to ‘no’ weight:
‘(4) No weight should be given to a private or family life established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom and—
(a) they require leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but do not have it or obtained it by deception, or
(b) they are in serious breach of a condition attached to their leave to enter or remain.’
I find this slightly baffling because this implies that it would not be a breach of Article 8 to remove someone who had lived in the UK for 40 years if those 40 years were spent here without permission, when it clearly would be in most cases, particularly where the appellant is not liable to be deported. Does that mean that in these cases, it will be assumed that Article 8 would be treated as not being engaged at all, with the consequence that people in this position can be deprived of their right of appeal against a refusal?
Subsection (5) is being amended so that family life formed when someone’s immigration status was precarious will also be given little weight (at present, it’s just private life).
Section 117B(6), which states that in a non-deportation case, public interest does not require someone’s removal if they have a relationship with a qualifying child and it would not be reasonable to remove the child from the UK, is also being restricted (I mean ‘clarified’) further:
‘(7) For the purposes of subsection (6)(b), it would not be reasonable to expect a child to leave the United Kingdom if (and only if) one or more of the following conditions are met—
(a) the child would not receive any education in the country to which the child is proposed to be relocated (the “new country”);
(b) there would be very significant obstacles to the child’s ability to adapt to or integrate into the new country;
(c) the child’s relocation to the new country would otherwise have a very significant and long-lasting adverse effect on the child.’
Deportation
In yet another attempt to twist Article 8 into what the government would like it to be, the family and private life test in deportation cases in section 117C is being amended in clause 20 to, again, make it harsher and to eliminate the sentence-based thresholds in the current version:
‘117C Article 8: cases involving foreign criminals and others liable to deportation
(1) Where a person is liable to deportation, the public interest, and in particular the interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder or crime, requires their deportation unless its effect on the person or a member of their family would be disproportionate.
(2) The more serious—
(a) an offence committed by a person,
(b) the nature and circumstances of a person’s offending, or
(c) the impact of a person’s offending on society as a whole, the greater is the public interest in the person’s deportation.
(3) The effect of a person’s deportation will be disproportionate if (and only if)—
(a) one (or more) of the following sets of exceptional circumstances applies, and
(b) the interference with a person’s rights under Article 8 that exist by virtue of those exceptional circumstances cannot be justified by the public interest in favour of the person’s deportation (see subsections (1) and (2) and section 117B(1) to (5)).
(4) The first set of exceptional circumstances applies where—
(a) the person has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life,
(b) the person is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to the person’s integration into the country to which they are proposed to be deported.
(5) The second set of exceptional circumstances applies where the person has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of the person’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6) The third set of exceptional circumstances applies where there are otherwise very compelling circumstances indicating that the person (or a member of their family) has a claim under Article 8 which is at least as strong as if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.’
Core protection
Clause 21 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations about protection status and protection claims, which can (and is likely to) include unifying the different protection statuses, including asylum and humanitarian protection, into a single unified ‘protection status’. However, while they may be equal, some protection statuses will be more equal than others:
‘(3) Regulations under subsection (1) may (among other things)—
(e) make different provision in relation to—
(i) protection status granted, and protection claims made, on the Convention ground, and
(ii) protection status granted, and protection claims made, on the humanitarian protection ground.’
Part of the reason for the unification appears to be to remove the right of appeal where someone is refused asylum but granted humanitarian protection.
The meaning of ‘lawfully staying’ for the purpose of the Refugee Convention, which entitles a refugee to a variety of rights, including the right to work, is undefined in the Convention. The government proposes to remedy this by amending the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 to include a new section:
’37A Persons within Article 33(2) not lawfully staying in United Kingdom
A person is not to be taken to be lawfully staying in the United Kingdom if, for the purposes of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention—
(a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the person as a danger to the security of the United Kingdom, or
(b) having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, the person constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom (see section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).’
Asylum support
In yet another attempt to out-Farage Farage, clause 23 gives the Secretary of State the power to require asylum support payments to be paid back once their claim has concluded, provided this would not make them destitute. Some limited guardrails are provided:
‘(6) A person is exempt for the purposes of this section if they—
(a) were under 18 at all times at which they received asylum support,
(b) started to receive asylum support before the day on which this section comes fully into force, or
(c) are of any other description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.’
The provisions are even designed to catch out someone who benefited from asylum support as a dependant, meaning you don’t need to be a main applicant to be required to make repayments. HM Revenue & Customs can be empowered to collect the money.
Modern slavery
The Bill contains a number of provisions designed to toughen anti-slavery measures but actually make things harder for victims of modern slavery. This is explained in the following terms in the explanatory notes:
’36. Since its conception in 2009 the system has faced significant challenges in adapting to increases in referrals, changes in the types of cases entering the system and regular litigation which has seen courts interpret the international obligations for the UK in ways that are not aligned with the intended operation of the NRM. The rights and obligations that flow from modern slavery legislation have meant that the NRM is susceptible to misuse, in particular to delay or prevent immigration removal action.’
One significant way that the Bill purports to do this is by adding an asylum-style provision to the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 that directs competent authorities to consider certain factors as damaging the credibility of the claimant:
’60A Deciding if a person is a victim: credibility
(1) Subsection (2) applies where a competent authority is making a reasonable grounds decision or a conclusive grounds decision in relation to a person.
(2) In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of the person, the competent authority must take account, as damaging the person’s credibility, of—
(a) any delay by the person in making a claim to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking,
(b) any delay by the person in providing the competent authority with any relevant status information,
(c) any material inaccuracy, inconsistency or omission in relevant status information provided by the person to the competent authority,
(d) any material inconsistency between relevant status information provided by the person to the competent authority and any information provided by the person in connection with—
(i) any protection claim or human rights claim made by the person, or
(ii) any civil or criminal proceedings to which the person is a party, and
(e) any striking similarity between the relevant status information provided by the person to the competent authority and any information provided by another person in connection with—
(i) a claim to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking made by that other person,
(ii) a protection claim or human rights claim made by that other person,
(iii) any civil or criminal proceedings to which that other person is a party.’
This naturally carries the same type of risks as it does in an asylum context, which the Bill attempts to address:
‘(3) But subsection (2) does not apply if the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons for the delay, inaccuracy, inconsistency, omission or similarity.’
A lot will depend on the quality of the instructions provided to competent authorities by the guidance that will be issued by the Home Office. However, based on its track record, it seems likely that the threshold to be applied for what is considered a ‘good reason’ will be unreasonably high, particularly when taking into account the vulnerable, marginalised nature of the cohort affected.
Clause 38 exempts children under 18 from being disqualified from protection but only if they have right of abode or leave to remain (other than under section 65 — leave granted to victims of modern slavery or trafficking), which is just a generally unpleasant approach.
The Bill inserts a new section 63A which creates a new disqualification from protection where someone has claimed to be a victim of modern slavery or trafficking in ‘bad faith’. This is defined as follows:
‘(3) For the purposes of this section, the circumstances in which a person’s claim to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking is to be taken to have been made in bad faith include, in particular—
(a) where the claim was made at a time when the person was due to be removed from the United Kingdom;
(b) where the person provided information in support of the claim knowing the information to be false or fabricated.’
There is even provision for the definition of ‘bad faith’ to be widened:
‘(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for further circumstances in which a claim to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking is to be taken for the purposes of this section to have been made in bad faith.’
Crucially, leave granted to victims of modern slavery or trafficking — those recognised as a likely victim, that is — is being eliminated. This is the leave granted under section 65(a) to aid physical or psychological recovery of the victims from their exploitation, commonly known as VTS leave. Leave granted for the purpose of obtaining compensation or assisting the authorities in investigation or prosecution is being retained. However, as Jennifer Blair noted, this merely removes the duty for leave to be granted, meaning it is still possible to grant leave to this cohort on a discretionary basis, at least in theory.
Nevertheless, it should go without saying that this will do untold damage to some of the most vulnerable people to interact with the UK government.
There are also myriad amendments to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 which are beyond the scope of this post.
Schedules
The first schedule amends various pieces of legislation to change references to the First-tier Tribunal to references to the new appeals authority, as well as replace the Tribunal Procedure Rules with the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority Procedure Rules (see third schedule, below).
The second schedule contains a variety of rules about how the authority’s members must be selected and makes it clear that they are not to be regarded as civil servants, in another bid to be seen as independent.
The third schedule provides for the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority Procedure Rules to be created and outlines their likely parameters, which are, for the most part, similar to the current rules. Perhaps the one big change is the provision in this schedule that requires the authority to create rules that mandate the publication of most decisions, as this is not currently the case with First-tier Tribunal decisions:
’13 (1) The Rules must provide that, subject to any provision made by virtue of rules under sub-paragraph (2), the IIAA must publish decisions made in the exercise of its primary function.
(2) The Rules may make provision—
(a) for an exception to the duty to publish such a decision where the IIAA is satisfied, having regard to the interests of justice, that it is proportionate not to do so;
(b) for the IIAA to publish a redacted or anonymised version of such a decision, so as to avoid publishing any information that would be likely to lead members of the public to identify any person whom the IIAA considers should not be identified.’
The fourth schedule sets out various provisions to aid the overhaul of the modern slavery and trafficking provisions touched on above.
Finally, the fifth schedule contains provisions regarding the content of slavery and human trafficking statements.
Conclusion
It’s a shocking if unsurprising Bill from a Labour government perfectly happy to screw over some of the most marginalised people in society to try to appease some of the very worst people in society. This will make a lot of people’s lives much worse for seemingly no reason other than to attempt to cling to power for a little while longer.
If the government legislated in all areas with the speed and ruthless efficiency of their immigration agenda, leasehold reform would have been completed. I would be in a position to buy a share of the freehold of my flat, a fact I’m reminded of every time I have to pay ground rent to the freeholder like a feudal peasant tilling the soil for his lord.