In yet another high-conflict case, Eccles v. Eccles 2025 ABCA 418, the Alberta Court of Appeal considered an appeal of a case management judge’s order, where the appellant mother sought to have the case management judge recuse himself on account of an alleged reasonable apprehension of bias.
The parties’ relationship started in 2007 and ended in 2021, with one child who was 9 years-old at the date of the appeal. The litigation history included four interim parenting orders, several scheduling orders, one litigation plan, and numerous court appearances, which included six other appeals filed by the mother, five of which were struck for various reasons.
In March 2024 a case management judge was assigned to the parties and the first order was made in July 2024, an order which continued an order by a chambers judge in 2023, which awarded the father sole decision-making authority over their child’s mental health, a responsibility which had previously been granted to the child’s mother.
In December 2024, the case management judge found that the mother was in contempt of the July 2024 order. Following the contempt order, the case management judge heard the father’s application to vary the parenting order and ordered that the mother’s parenting time would be suspended for a period of 60 days, except for parenting time on Christmas Day.
The order went on to provide that after the 60-day suspension, the mother’s parenting time would be limited and supervised by her parents and the child would continue to live with his father and engage in reunification therapy directed at parental alienation. The mother appealed this order, but her appeal was struck for failure to file a factum. She later applied, unsuccessfully, to reinstate the appeal.
At a hearing before the case management judge after the suspension period, the mother informed the judge that she intended to bring an application alleging bias on his part. At this point, the mother’s parents advised they were no longer willing to supervise the mother’s parenting and a parenting supervisor was appointed. Other case management procedural orders were made in April 2025, which the mother appealed, and sought an extension of time to comply with the appellate rules. That appeal was also dismissed.
In July 2025 a further case management hearing was held where the mother proceeded with her recusal application. The judge asked her to identify the evidence she relied on and she replied that she was relying on the record generally. She also reminded the judge that he had previously conducted an early intervention case conference dealing with interim support. Following the EICC the judge prepared a memo to the parties advising that he would be disqualified from hearing the trial or other interlocutory matters on account of him overseeing the EICC.
However, later the father’s lawyer, with the mother’s knowledge, wrote to the judge requesting that he take on the role of case management judge. The judge agreed and the mother did not object.
The judge made herculean efforts to assist the mother, referring her to the applicable law and directing her to identify her substantive concerns, observing that her main issue was his conduct of the EICC, which he determined did not impact his impartiality. After a brief recess, the judge returned to the courtroom and dismissed her recusal application.
Having resolved that matter, he advised the parties that he would next deal with the father’s parenting application, whereupon the mother requested an adjournment, which was denied. The mother argued with the judge alleging that his dismissal of her recusal motion, followed by his decision to proceed with the father’s parenting application was evidence of “reportable judicial misconduct”.
The judge again, “bent over backwards”, to assist the mother, taking her through each element of the father’s submissions to elicit her reply to each issue. The father sought a reduction in the mother’s parenting time, which was denied, but the judge did reduce the mother’s block vacation time with the child and made a number of procedural orders.
Her grounds of appeal included the assertion that the reduction of her parenting time ignored the best interests of the child; that her right to be heard on critical parenting issues had been curtailed; and that the judge’s reliance on the respondent’s counsel’s submissions showed bias. She also contended that father’s lawyer engaged in improper communication with the judge.
Dismissing her appeal, the high court noted the discretionary nature of parenting decisions where a high level of deference was required “because of the case management judge’s intimate knowledge of the litigation”, citing Blume v. Blume 2024 ABCA 343 and Unterschult v. Clark 2022 ABCA 335.
The court remarked that judges are presumed to act impartially, with judicial integrity, citing Cojocaru v. BC Women’s Hospital 2013 SCC 30.
Finally, the court found that the mother’s complaints that the judge repeatedly disregarded or refused to engage with her submissions or evidence, was not supported by the record. While the appeal court accepted that her self-represented status was challenging for her, they found that the judge was alive to these concerns and made efforts to accommodate her. Ultimately, the appeal court held that her complaints arose only after certain decisions were unfavourable to her, stating “the law is clear, a judge need not recuse himself just because he has made some, or many, rulings against a party.” Dykun v. Odishaw 2001 ABCA 204.