I’m always a little bit worried when a court decides to reject the positions of both parties in a case. There’s a danger in such settings that the tribunal is doing something without adequate briefing or consideration.
But here, the California Supreme Court’s disposition seems not only entirely reasonable, but equitable as well. (I also love that Justice Corrigan’s introductory paragraphs almost entirely spell out both the issue as well as the ultimate resolution.)
The first three paragraphs of the opinion tell you all you need to know:
“We are once again called upon to consider “the intersection
of [the] statutory scheme of plea bargaining and the
retroactivity rule of [In re] Estrada [(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.]”
[Cite] Defendant Sunee Lynn Mitchell accepted a plea bargain,
entered the standard waivers, and agreed to an upper term
sentence on one felony count of a multicount information. While
her case was pending on appeal the Legislature amended Penal
Code1
section 1170, which governs California’s determinate
sentencing law. The amendment now requires that the facts
used to justify an upper term be stipulated to or proven beyond
a reasonable doubt at a jury or court trial. [Cite] The parties agree this statutory
amendment applies retroactively to nonfinal judgments under
Estrada. Mitchell’s further assertion that the plea bargain, as
constituted, did not satisfy the current statutory requirements
is likewise not contested by the Attorney General.
The parties’ point of disagreement centers on the effect, if
any, of section 1170(b)’s provisions on the negotiated disposition.
Mitchell argues she should continue to have the benefits of her
plea bargain, including the dismissal of counts and insulation
from exposure to a substantially higher sentence. However, she urges the upper term sentence she agreed to should be reduced
to the middle term. The Attorney General argues the agreement
should be enforced in its entirety because the trial court did not
impose a sentence under the provisions of section 1170(b), but
rather upon the terms of the bargain.
We reject both positions. We hold that defendants like
Mitchell, who agreed to an upper term sentence as part of a plea
bargain, may seek the retroactive benefit of section 1170(b)’s
amended provisions to their nonfinal judgments. We reverse the
Court of Appeal’s contrary holding and direct that the matter be
returned to the trial court in a manner similar to the approach
adopted in People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps). On
remand, Mitchell may either waive or invoke section 1170(b)’s
requirements. If she reaffirms her acceptance of the plea
bargain and waives the rights now conferred under section
1170(b), the court shall reinstate the original sentence as
negotiated by the parties. If she declines to enter that waiver,
in lieu of further proceedings the parties may agree to modify
the existing plea bargain and accept a midterm base sentence
on count 4, then seek the court’s approval of that downward
departure. Absent a modified agreement and approval,
Mitchell’s remedy is to withdraw her assent to the bargain, in
which case Mitchell’s plea will be set aside and the parties
returned to a pre-plea posture. At that point they would remain
free to renegotiate further if they choose or to proceed to trial.”
I totally agree.
A deal’s a deal. But if circumstances then materially change, the deal gets reconsidered. If both sides still want to go through with it, great. But if either side wants to back out, that’s fine too.
Hurrah.