Listen to this articleCivil
Judicial Discipline
Suspension
This proceeding arose from a formal complaint and an amended formal complaint filed by the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards against the Honorable John P. Dehen, Judge of District Court for the Tenth Judicial District, alleging violations of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Dehen filed a response denying the allegations of misconduct. Following a two-day hearing, the appointed panel made several findings. First, it found that Judge Dehen improperly issued two writs of mandamus compelling a District Court administrator to increase his court reporter’s compensation, despite Judge Dehen having a conflict of interest, and without giving the District Court administrator a meaningful opportunity to respond. Second, the panel found that in five cases where Judge Dehen was requested to appoint guardians for at-risk juveniles, he failed to follow the statutory requirements and showed bias against non-citizen juveniles seeking special immigration status. Third, the panel found that Judge Dehen improperly presided over a remote juvenile court calendar while riding in a moving vehicle. The panel concluded that based on these three instances of misconduct, Judge Dehen violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3(A), 2.4, 2.5, 2.6(A), 2.8, and 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The panel recommended that Judge Dehen be censured and suspended from judicial office without pay for six months. Judge Dehen appealed the panel’s findings.
The Supreme Court held that (1) a judge does not commit misconduct by making findings of fact, reaching a legal conclusion, or applying the law as understood by the judge unless the judge acts contrary to clear and determined law and the error is egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a pattern or practice of legal error; (2) a judge violates the Code of Judicial Conduct by improperly issuing two writs of mandamus compelling a District Court administrator to increase the compensation for the judge’s court reporter, despite having a conflict of interest, and without giving the District Court administrator a meaningful opportunity to respond, when clear and determined law proscribes such actions and the judge’s contrary position therefore represents egregious error; (3) a judge does not violate Rule 2.3(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct by making rulings in proceedings under Minn. Stat. ch. 257D, even if those rulings are erroneous, when those rulings are neither foreclosed by clear and determined law nor the product of actual bias or prejudice; (4) a judge violates the Code of Judicial Conduct by conducting a remote calendar from a moving car in order to be able to travel to attend a family function; (5) censure and suspension from judicial duties for nine months (or from the practice of law for a term equal to the balance of the judicial suspension if the judge ceases to be a judge before the term of judicial suspension ends) without pay is warranted for a judge who violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by improperly issuing two writs of mandamus compelling a District Court administrator to increase the compensation for the judge’s court reporter, despite having a conflict of interest, and without giving the District Court administrator a meaningful opportunity to respond, and by improperly presiding over a remote court calendar while riding in a moving vehicle; and (6) a public reprimand as an attorney is warranted for a judge who engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by improperly issuing two writs of mandamus compelling a District Court administrator to increase the compensation for the judge’s court reporter, despite having a conflict of interest, and without giving the District Court administrator a meaningful opportunity to respond, and by improperly presiding over a remote court calendar while riding in a moving vehicle. Ordered accordingly.
A24-0694 Inquiry into Conduct of Dehen (Original Jurisdiction)
Landlord & Tenant
Eviction
This case concerned the common law doctrine of waiver by acceptance of rent, which bars a landlord from evicting tenants for a past breach of lease if the landlord accepts rent with knowledge of the breach. In Westminster Corp. v. Anderson, the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of waiver by acceptance did not apply to rental payments made by public housing agencies on behalf of tenants. 536 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Minn. App. 1995). Here, both the District Court and Court of Appeals held that Westminster controlled and that, following Westminster, the doctrine of waiver by acceptance did not apply in this case.
Overruling Westminster, the Supreme Court held that (1) the common law rule that a landlord who accepts rent with knowledge of a tenant’s breach waives the right to evict based on that breach applies equally to private and publicly subsidized tenancies; and (2) whether a landlord has accepted rent for the purpose of the waiver-by-acceptance doctrine is a question of fact that is determined based on the totality of the circumstances, including a landlord’s conduct after a rental payment is made. Reversed and remanded.
A23-1048 Hook & Ladder Apts., L.P. v. Nalewaja (Court of Appeals)
Tax
Franchise Tax
Under Minnesota’s corporate franchise tax statute, a multistate business’s income from services is attributed to the state where the services are “received.” At issue here was a combined Minnesota franchise tax return filed by relator for the 2016 tax year. Relator received compensation from an insurance company in exchange for pharmacy benefit management services. Relator initially attributed receipts from relator’s services to Minnesota based on the number of insurance plan members who filled prescriptions in Minnesota in 2016. Relator later amended its tax return, changing course and attributing the receipts from relator’s services to Wisconsin, the location of insurance company’s headquarters. Based on this change, relator sought a refund of $830,884, plus interest. Respondent—the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue—denied relator’s refund claim in full, and relator appealed by filing a complaint in District Court. The District Court transferred the case to the Tax Court, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment after stipulating to undisputed facts, and the Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion.
The Supreme Court held that (1) under Minn. Stat. § 290.191, subd. 5(j), which prescribes that “[r]eceipts from the performance of services must be attributed to the state where the services are received,” the term “received” is not limited to receipt by a direct customer; and (2) under the unique circumstances of this case, and because the taxpayer failed to meet its burden to prove that the Commissioner of Revenue’s tax assessment was invalid, the Tax Court did not err by granting summary judgment to the Commissioner. Affirmed.
A25-0058 Humana MarketPoint, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue (Tax Court)
Trusts
Appeals
This case required a determination as to whether actions the District Court took under Minnesota’s Trust Code were immediately appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(b), which allows for an interlocutory appeal “from an order which grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction.” Appellant served as trustee of two family trusts that were established for the benefit of appellant and his sisters, respondents. In 2023, respondents filed a petition in the District Court seeking a declaratory judgment that appellant breached his duties as trustee, requesting his removal as trustee, and demanding the return of disputed real property to the trusts. No formal injunction was sought. After an initial order granting respondent’s request for a declaratory judgment, the District Court issued an order removing appellant as trustee, naming respondent as successor trustee, and ordering appellant to restore the disputed property to the trusts. The District Court also ordered respondent, the successor trustee, to investigate whether appellant made any transactions that should be reimbursed to the trusts and to submit any reimbursement requests to the District Court for approval; determined that respondent were entitled to reimbursement for costs, disbursements, and attorney fees in bringing this action, and ordered them to submit those reimbursement requests for approval; and ordered ongoing review hearings until the trusts are terminated. Appellant appealed this interlocutory order, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as premature.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the District Court’s order requiring the trustee to restore real property to two family trusts is not an order that “grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction” under Rule 103.03(b), and therefore it is not immediately appealable under that rule; and (2) the District Court’s order removing the trustee from two family trusts and appointing a successor trustee is not an order that “grants, refuses, dissolves or refuses to dissolve, an injunction” under Rule 103.03(b), and therefore it is not immediately appealable under that rule. Affirmed.
A24-1189 In re Trust Created by Johnson (Court of Appeals)
Criminal
Sentencing
Restitution
The question in this case was whether defendant’s challenges to four awards of restitution were sufficiently detailed to place the burden on the State to prove the amount of loss supporting those awards. A jury found defendant guilty of 29 criminal offenses, including racketeering, theft, receiving stolen property, and falsifying information. The District Court convicted defendant of these offenses and sentenced him to 117 months in prison for racketeering. The District Court also granted awards of restitution to 13 victims. Defendant filed an affidavit that challenged each award. After a hearing, the District Court vacated the four awards relevant to the present appeal, based on its determination that the State had not met its burden of proving the amount of loss sustained by the victims.
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reinstated the four awards.
The Supreme Court held that (1) to satisfy the offender’s initial burden of production under Minn. Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3, an affidavit challenging a restitution award must specify, for each item, whether the challenge pertains to the amount of loss supporting the award, to the appropriateness of awarding restitution for that item, or both; and (2) a remand to District Court is appropriate to allow the parties to comply with the court’s interpretation of § 611A.045, subd. 3. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.