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Attorney Discipline
Public Reprimand
The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility filed a petition under Rule 12(d) requesting imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent Wesley R. Martins. In August 2023, the courts of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, a federally recognized Indian tribe, determined that Martins committed professional misconduct before the courts of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Court of Central Jurisdiction. The Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Court of Appeals suspended Martins from the practice of law for one year, issued a public reprimand, and required Martins to make a public apology to the presiding judge in the matter in which Martins’s misconduct took place.
The Supreme Court held that (1) tribal courts are jurisdictions for the purpose of authorizing reciprocal attorney discipline under Rule 12(d); (2) the discipline imposed by the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe on Wesley R. Martins—specifically a one-year suspension from the practice of law, a public reprimand, and the requirement of a public apology—was substantially different than the discipline warranted in the State of Minnesota for Martins’s misconduct; and (3) a public reprimand was the appropriate discipline for Martins’s misconduct before the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Court of Central Jurisdiction. Publicly reprimanded.
A24-0417 In re Martins (Original Jurisdiction)
Judgments
Preverdict Interest
This case presented two issues of statutory interpretation arising from the statute governing preverdict interest, Minn. Stat. § 549.09, subd. 1(b). The first issue, the accrual issue, is whether a two-year commencement requirement applies when a party serves a written offer of settlement. This issue stems from the provision of the statute which states that for preverdict interest to begin accruing from the time a party serves its notice of claim, “[t]he action must be commenced within two years of a written notice of claim.” The second issue, the calculation issue, is whether preverdict interest is calculated based on the amount of damages awarded by the jury before accounting for amounts the plaintiff received from collateral sources or on the judgment after accounting for such payments. This issue stems from a different part of the statute which provides that when a party “serves a written offer of settlement,” the “prevailing party shall receive [preverdict] interest on any judgment or award.”
The Supreme Court held that (1) for purposes of recovering preverdict interest, serving a written offer of settlement does not negate the requirement in § 549.09, subd. 1(b), that an “action must be commenced within two years of a written notice of claim for interest to begin to accrue from the time of the notice of claim”; and (2) under § 549.09, subd. 1(b), the prevailing party is entitled to preverdict interest on the judgment, which does not include collateral sources deducted from the jury verdict. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
A24-0106 Scheurer v. Shrewsbury (Court of Appeals)
Criminal
Terry Stop
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
At issue here was whether police officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to conduct the pat-frisk of then-juvenile appellant, which revealed that appellant possessed a handgun. The district court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the handgun as a result of the search. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers reasonably suspected that appellant might be armed and dangerous when they conducted the pat-frisk.
The Supreme Court held that police officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant was armed and dangerous when they conducted a pat-frisk of the appellant because mere proximity to a suspect in an alleged crime is not enough to support reasonable, articulable suspicion for a warrantless pat-frisk. Reversed and remanded.