Listen to this articleCivil
Workers’ Compensation
Attorney Fees
In this workers’ compensation case the Court was asked to decide whether the attorney for relator presented sufficient evidence to prove that he recovered an ascertainable dollar amount of medical benefits for relator under the Roraff attorney fees statute. Following an attorney fee hearing, the compensation judge ordered relator’s employer, respondent, along with its insurers, to pay Roraff fees to relator’s attorney. In determining that the dollar value of medical benefits was ascertainable, as is required to award Roraff fees, the compensation judge relied on an exhibit that the judge referred to as “itemized medical bills from the Mayo Clinic.” The compensation judge noted that relator had attached this document to his petition, which was introduced into evidence at the attorney fee hearing. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) concluded that the dollar value of medical benefits was not ascertainable because the appellate record did not contain itemized bills from the Mayo Clinic. But the WCCA did not address whether the evidence that was part of the appellate record—including relator’s attorney’s sworn testimony and the exhibit relator’s attorney created titled “Employee’s Itemization of Benefits Claimed”—was adequate to support the compensation judge’s findings.
The Supreme Court held that the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must assess whether there is evidence in the record that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a compensation judge’s determination that an employee’s attorney recovered an ascertainable dollar amount of medical benefits under Minn. Stat. § 176.081, subd. 1(a) (2024). Reversed and remanded.
A24-0454 Bjornson v. McNeilus Cos., Inc. (Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals)
Criminal
Evidence
Alternative Perpetrators
This case presented a narrow question: when a defendant has satisfied the requirements necessary to present an alternative perpetrator defense, does the District Court have discretion to allow the defendant to call the alleged alternative perpetrator as a witness when it is known that the alternative perpetrator will invoke the right against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury? The state charged defendant with second-degree intentional murder. Defendant asserted that another person committed the murder. The District Court determined that Foster had met the requirements set out in State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1977), to present an alternative perpetrator defense. The District Court denied defendant’s request to call the alleged perpetrator after the alleged perpetrator invoked his right against self-incrimination before trial. A jury found defendant guilty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that (1) defendant did not properly preserve the question of whether a defendant, who has satisfied the required test to present an alternative perpetrator defense, is entitled to call the alternative perpetrator to appear before the jury for a nontestimonial purpose; (2) when a defendant has satisfied the required test to present an alternative perpetrator defense, a District Court has discretion under the ordinary rules of evidence to allow the defendant to call the alternative perpetrator as a trial witness, even when it is known that the alternative perpetrator will invoke their right against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury; and (3) the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s request to call an alternative perpetrator to the witness stand based on needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Affirmed.
A21-0070, A21-0583 State v. Foster (Court of Appeals)
Indecent Exposure
Lewdness
This case arose from defendant’s misdemeanor conviction under the indecent exposure statute, Minn. Stat. § 617.23, subd. 1(1). The relevant provision prohibits a person from “willfully and lewdly” exposing their “body, or the private parts thereof.” The state charged defendant under this provision for exposing her breasts in a gas station parking lot. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the state lacked probable cause for her arrest because breasts are not “private parts” under the statute and, even if they were, her exposure was not “lewd.” The District Court denied her motion, found her guilty, and convicted her of misdemeanor indecent exposure after a stipulated-evidence trial. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a divided opinion.
The Supreme Court held that (1) to “lewdly” expose oneself in violation of § 617.23, subd. 1(1), a person must engage in conduct of a sexual nature; and (2) the state did not present evidence sufficient to prove that the appellant “lewdly” exposed her “body, or the private parts thereof” under § 617.23, subd. 1(1), because the record did not show that defendant engaged in conduct of a sexual nature. Affirmed.
A23-0158 State v. Plancarte (Court of Appeals)
Postconviction Relief
Time Bar
Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder during a drive-by shooting. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed. More than 16 years later, petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief asserting that the state had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by failing to disclose the specific terms of a plea agreement offered to one of the state’s witnesses to testify against petitioner. The District Court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that there was no factual support for petitioner’s assertion that the state had not disclosed the plea agreement to him, and that, even if there were factual support for that assertion, the evidence he presented failed to satisfy the newly discovered evidence and interests of justice exceptions to the two-year statutory time bar to filing a petition for postconviction relief.
The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it summarily denied petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief because, even accepting the evidence presented in support of the petition as true, petitioner was conclusively entitled to no relief. Affirmed.
A24-0930 Paul v. State (Hennepin County)
Orders
Attorney Discipline
Reinstatement
Daniel Miller was reinstated to the practice of law and placed on probation for two years.
Attorney Discipline
Suspension
Zaylore S. Stout was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with no right to petition for reinstatement for one year.
Felony Murder
Appeals
Applicant filed a preliminary application for relief from his first-degree felony murder conviction under a 2023 session law that entitles persons convicted of first- or second-degree felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory of criminal liability to petition to have their convictions reviewed and vacated if they can establish certain facts, including that they “did not cause the death of a human being.” The District Court denied the application. At issue here was what sort of appeal was available. The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction over applicant’s appeal from the denial of his preliminary application under the Act. Appeal to proceed.
Summary Dispositions
Appeal Dismissed
The Supreme Court’s order granting review of the August 5, 2024 decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the appeal was dismissed.