Listen to this articleCivil Nonprecedential
Breach of Contract
Jury Findings
Respondents-siblings sued appellant, their brother, arguing that he breached a contract by failing to transfer to them an interest in land. A jury determined that appellant breached the contract. On appeal, appellant argued that the District Court erred by (1) denying his motion for summary judgment, (2) fashioning an equitable remedy for one of his siblings, and (3) not considering his counterclaims. Noting that appellant failed to move for judgment as a matter of law, the Court of Appeals concluded that appellant effectively forfeited a challenge to the jury’s determinations that there was sufficient consideration for contract formation and that the contract had not been rescinded. Furthermore, the equitable remedy was within the District Court’s broad discretion, and appellant forfeited any arguments concerning his counterclaims. Affirmed.
A24-0159 Saxhaug v. Saxhaug (St. Louis County)
Civil Commitment
Attorney Fees
In this dispute regarding the attorney fees arising out of civil-commitment-related disputes, appellant county argued that the District Court erred by (1) deciding that the county was statutorily required to pay committee’s attorney fees; and (2) determining that a contract between the county and respondent law firm provided a separate basis for requiring the county to pay the fees. The Court of Appeals concluded that the statute did not require the county to pay attorney fees for legal actions seeking writs of mandamus and habeas corpus. The Court also reversed and remanded for the District Court to analyze whether the terms of the contract allowed for fees and, potentially to hold an evidentiary hearing related to the parties’ past course-of-conduct. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A24-0255 In re Civ. Commitment of Ly (Scott County)
Construction
Workmanlike Manner
This lawsuit centered on the installation of flooring in a warehouse built by appellant-contractor for use by respondent-tenant). The warehouse was owned by appellant-landlord, which had entered into a lease agreement with tenant. After tenant withheld rent alleging material defects in the warehouse flooring, landlord filed a lawsuit against tenant. Tenant responded with a counterclaim alleging that landlord materially breached its lease by not ensuring the correct floor was put down. And tenant filed a third-party complaint against contractor alleging that it negligently constructed the floor. A jury found that tenant breached its lease by refusing to pay rent and the associated late fees. And while the jury concluded the landlord breached the lease by not laying the proper flooring, tenant’s breach-of-contract claim against landlord ultimately failed and no damages were awarded because the jury found that tenant suffered no harm. Finally, the jury found contractor liable to tenant for negligent construction of the warehouse floor. On appeal, contractor argued the District Court erred when it denied a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) that requested the court overturn the jury’s verdict on the negligence claim because it improperly conflated tort and contract duties of care. Landlord also appealed and claims that the District Court abused its discretion by denying a motion for the enforcement of contractually mandated attorney fees.
The Court of Appeals concluded that, because no record evidence established that the contractor breached its duty to tenant to construct the warehouse floor in a workmanlike manner, the District Court’s erred in denying contractor’s motion for JMOL. But there was no error in the denial of landlord’s motion for attorney fees because the District Court acted within its broad discretion by concluding that landlord’s affidavit did not satisfy the requirements articulated in Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 119.02. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A24-0424, A24-0425 Indus. Equities – River Rd., LLC v. Curtis 1000, Inc. (Anoka County)
Domestic Relations
Child Custody; Modification
Appellant-father challenged the District Court’s order modifying custody and parenting time to award respondent-mother sole legal and sole physical custody of their three children, and to award father parenting time with two of the three children. The Court of Appeals concluded that the custody modification was within the District Court’s discretion and there was no due process violation. Affirmed.
A24-0290 Cross v. Cross (Hennepin County)
Drivers’ License Revocation
Ignition Interlock Device
Appellant challenged the denial of his enrollment in the Minnesota Ignition Interlock Device (IID) Program, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that he was ineligible for the program because his driving privileges in Minnesota were cancelled due to the revocation of his driving privileges in Wisconsin. Noting that appellant violated Minn. Stat. § 171.17, subd. 1(a)(9), which is not among the statutes listed as eligible for IID enrollment, the Court of Appeals found no error. Affirmed.
A24-0315 Peach v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety (Chisago County)
Fiduciary Duties
Relationship
This appeal was before the court for a second time following a decision by the Supreme Court that reversed in part a previous decision and remanded for consideration of an issue not addressed in the previous decision. Specifically, at issue was whether the District Court erred by dismissing appellants’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim on the ground that appellants were not owed fiduciary duties as beneficial owners of stock. The Court of Appeals first determined that, in the absence of a per se fiduciary relationship, the question of whether a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of fact. And the Court also determined that evidence could be produced, consistent with appellants’ pleadings, to support the existence of a fiduciary relationship between appellants and respondent. And thus, the District Court erred by dismissing appellants’ claim for breaches of fiduciary duty. Reversed in part and remanded.
A22-0777 Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. (Scott County)
Easements
Jurisdiction
Appellants own two adjacent lots in a subdivision. Both lots abut a street, which has a cartway easement providing public access to a lake. Respondents are neighboring landowners who sued appellants and respondent township, seeking declaratory relief related to street. Appellants, in turn, counterclaimed against respondent neighbors and cross-claimed against the township for declaratory relief. Appellants appealed from the District Court’s final judgment, issued after a bench trial, granting declaratory relief to respondent neighbors and ordering appellants to remove part of a retaining wall that extended onto Lake Street and restore a concrete slab used to launch boats. Appellants contended that the District Court erred because it (1) lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) made clearly erroneous factual findings, (3) declared that the fee owners of lots adjacent to the street are “authorized to maintain the [s]treet easement,” and (4) “lacked authority” to order appellants to replace the concrete slab and remove a portion of their retaining wall based on a 2011 permit issued by the county, which is not a party. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction, its factual findings were supported by the record evidence, and relevant statutes and common law supported the relief granted by the District Court. Affirmed.
A23-1636 Sanden v. Tysdal (Otter Tail County)
Employment
Overtime
Appellant attorney general (AG) appealed the dismissal of its lawsuit against respondent Madison Equities, Inc., under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12. The AG’s complaint contained two counts alleging, first, a violation of the overtime provisions of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA), Minn. Stat. §§ 177.21-.35; and, second, retaliation in violation of the Minnesota whistleblower statute, Minn. Stat. § 181.932. The District Court dismissed the MFLSA claim as time-barred and the whistleblower retaliation claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The AG argued on appeal that the running of the statute of limitations for its MFLSA claim was tolled by respondent’s litigation seeking to quash the AG’s civil investigative demand (CID). The AG issued the CID, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 8.31, to investigate potential wage-hour violations by respondent. The AG argued, in the alternative, that the MFLSA claim was timely because it was governed by the six-year limitations period under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, not the two-year or three- year limitations period for wage-hour violations under Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5). As to its whistleblower retaliation claim, the AG argued that the District Court erred in ruling that acts by former employees are excluded from the protections of the whistleblower statute.
Despite valid policy reasons put forward by the AG in favor of tolling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the AG’s MFLSA claim as time-barred because of a lack of Minnesota caselaw that has applied tolling in this type of circumstance. But the Court reversed the dismissal of the AG’s whistleblower retaliation claim and remand the case to the District Court because the District Court erred in its determination that the protections of the whistleblower statute did not extend to former employees. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A24-0107 State Office of Att’y Gen. v. Madison Equities, Inc. (Ramsey County)
Gambling
Approved Plans
Respondent casino successfully petitioned the Minnesota Racing Commission for permission to amend its floor plan to add an electronic dealer table linked to blackjack and baccarat player stations that allow patrons to play against the dealer. Relator-tribe challenged the commission’s approval in this certiorari appeal, arguing that the decision exceeded the commission’s regulatory authority, unlawfully allowed respondent to operate gambling devices and video games of chance, and unlawfully allowed respondent to operate a number of tables that exceeded the statutory limit. Relator argued relatedly that the commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and rested on an unpromulgated rule. The Court of Appeals rejected the commission’s and respondent’s contention that relator lacked standing to challenge the commission’s decision and decided the appeal on substance. Because the legislature had not defined “tables used for card playing” and the commission’s decision implicitly adopted the interpretation that seemed most reasonable, the Court of Appeals concluded that the commission acted within its statutory authority when it approved the amended floor plan that was consistent with the number of dealer tables. Affirmed.
A23-1738 In re Minn. Racing Comm’n’s Approval of Running Aces Casino (Minn. Racing Comm’n)
Harassment Restraining Orders
Harassment
Appellant challenged the grant of respondent’s petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against him. The Court of Appeals concluded that the record supported the District Court’s determination that appellant contacted respondent using the phone number at issue, and the District Court did not err by finding that appellant sent multiple text messages to respondent and that appellant’s behavior constituted harassment. Affirmed.
A24-0141 Evans v. Couch (Pope County)
Service of Process
Substitute Service
In this insurance-coverage dispute, appellant-insured argued that the District Court erred in granting respondent-insurer’s motion to dismiss appellant’s complaint for insufficiency of service of process.
The Court of Appeals concluded that appellant’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment did not qualify under Minn. Stat. § 45.028 for substitute service of process on the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce. Affirmed.
A24-0251 Lehnertz v. RAM Mut. Ins. Co. (Wabasha County)
Limited Liability Companies
Operating Agreements
Appellant challenged the judgment entered following a court trial regarding his dispute with respondent, a limited liability company (LLC) that appellant and two other members formed. Appellant argued that the District Court (1) erred by concluding that a section of respondent’s operating agreement was void as “manifestly unreasonable” under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0110, subd. 4; (2) erred in expelling him as a member of respondent under Minn. Stat. § 322C.0602, effective before the date of its order; (3) abused its discretion by awarding respondent lost profits for appellant’s competition with respondent in breach of the operating agreement; and (4) abused its discretion in determining the value of appellant’s share in respondent at the time of his expulsion. Noting that the agreement section exhaustively prohibited the members from engaging in any form of competition with the LLC, not only during their membership but for two years thereafter, the Court of Appeals concluded that the purported agreement to eliminate the members’ duty not to compete with the LLC was manifestly unreasonable and, therefore, void. And the District Court did not err in its other rulings. Affirmed.
A24-0215 Absolute Sports Cards, LLC v. Thornton (Scott County)
Civil Order Opinions
Domestic Relations
Child Protection; Hearings
Appellant-mother appealed a District Court decision to file a default order after denying her request to participate remotely at a pretrial hearing. The default order regarded respondent county’s petition to transfer permanent legal and physical custody of one of her children to the child’s father. The Court of Appeals concluded that mother did not meet her burden to show that her remote participation would have materially affected the District Court’s decision to transfer custody. Affirmed.
A24-0452 In re Welfare of Child of M.R.S. (Dakota County)
Public Employment
Health Insurance
In this certiorari appeal, relator, a former police officer, challenged an administrative-law judge’s (ALJ) decision to grant respondent city’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that relator was not entitled to continuing health insurance coverage under Minn. Stat. § 299A.465 because he signed a separation agreement with the city that included a release of all claims. Relator argued that § 299A.465 did not provide an ALJ with the statutory authority to decide whether he contractually waived claims related to continued health insurance coverage. The Court of Appeals agreed that the ALJ lacked statutory authority to decide this matter. Reversed.
A24-0381 City of Breezy Point v. Reiber (Office of Admin. Hearings)
Criminal Precedential
Warrantless Searches
Exclusionary Rule
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of ammunition by an ineligible person and driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety. He moved to suppress evidence of the ammunition and to dismiss the ammunition-possession charge on the ground that a police officer found the ammunition in a warrantless search of a vehicle that was not supported by probable cause. The District Court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed the ammunition-possession charge. The state appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that, before the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164 (Minn. 2023), this court’s caselaw authorized a law-enforcement officer to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, so long as the officer had probable cause to believe that more than 1.4 grams of marijuana was in the vehicle. Evidence obtained in such a search conducted before Torgerson need not be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule because, at that time, a well-trained law-enforcement officer would have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. Reversed and remanded.
A24-0385 State v. Douglas (Scott County)
Criminal Nonprecedential
Complaints
Amendment
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for fleeing police in a motor vehicle and second-degree controlled-substance crime, defendant argued that his convictions must be reversed because the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the state to amend the complaint after he had signed a petition to plead guilty to the charges in the original complaint. Noting that defendant’s guilty plea was not formally accepted by the District Court and that his case was thus still in the pretrial phase, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court acted within its discretion by allowing the state to amend the complaint. Affirmed.
A23-1736 State v. Williamson (Nicollet County)
Criminal Sexual Conduct
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant challenged his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to allow the District Court to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there were significant reasons to doubt the victim’s credibility. Noting that the eight-year-old victim consistently reported that defendant assaulted her and that any uncertainty about how old she was when the acts started and ended was reasonable given her young age, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Affirmed.
A23-1651 State v. Willis (Hennepin County)
Evidence
Relevance
Defendant was convicted and sentenced for various theft-related and violent crimes following a jury trial. He challenged his convictions and sentences for attempted theft, attempted first-degree burglary, and attempted second-degree murder, arguing that the District Court committed reversible error by, inter alia, admitting a video defendant had recorded three years earlier describing a plan to shoot a gun-store owner and others, and expressed no hesitation to shoot people. The Court of Appeals concluded that the contents of the video were irrelevant to the charged offenses, the video was unfairly prejudicial, and defendant did not open the door to introduction of the video as rebuttal evidence by testifying that he did not intent to hurt one of the victims. Furthermore, there was a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted video significantly affected the verdict. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A23-1600 State v. Buck (Sherburne County)
Hearsay
Excited Utterances
Defendant challenged his conviction for domestic assault by strangulation, arguing that the District Court improperly admitted hearsay evidence. Defendant also argued that the District Court erred by imposing probationary conditions as part of his executed sentence. The Court of Appeals concluded that the 911 calls from the underlying incident fell within the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule and were therefore properly admitted into evidence. However, the District Court erred by imposing probationary conditions as part of an executed prison sentence. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A23-1200 State v. Blakey (Hennepin County)
Jury Instruction
Plain Error
Defendant challenged his convictions of third- and fifth-degree assault, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion by instructing the jury that it would not have access to audio recordings while deliberating and, even if he did not preserve the issue with an objection, the instruction was plainly erroneous. Noting that the District Court’s instruction accurately stated the substance of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(1)—that the jury would not have access to the audio recording in the jury room, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate that giving the instruction constituted prejudicial plain error. Affirmed.
A23-1774 State v. Zarate (Mower County)
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Harmless Error
In this direct appeal from two convictions of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. Alternatively, defendant claimed that the District Court erred by imposing a lifetime conditional-release period rather than a ten-year conditional-release period. The Court of Appeals concluded that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly aligning himself with the jury by using the phrase “my world and our world” and making minor misstatement regarding the victim’s ability to write a check were harmless, but that this misconduct was harmless. And the District Court did not err by imposing a lifetime conditional-release period. Affirmed.
A23-1398 State v. Bewaji (Blue Earth County)
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Plain Error
Defendant challenged his conviction for failure to register as a predatory offender, arguing that his conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because the prosecutor committed plain-error misconduct in eliciting inadmissible testimony during trial. Noting that the alleged misconduct was limited to one question posed to a single witness, the Court of Appeals concluded that the misconduct alleged by defendant did not affect his substantial rights because there was no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct would have significantly affected the verdict. Affirmed.
A23-1694 State v. Phipps (Lake County)
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Eliciting Testimony
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for second-degree driving while impaired (DWI)—refusal to submit to testing, defendant sought a new trial, arguing that it was plain error for the prosecutor to elicit expert opinion testimony from the state trooper. Alternatively, defendant demanded a new trial based on her assertion that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied her requested jury instruction on the element of refusal. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the trooper that he had determined refusal to comply with testing occurred. And the jury instructions fairly and adequately explained the law to the jury. Affirmed.
A23-1905 State v. Schmeichel (Anoka County)
Sentencing
Downward Departures
Defendant challenged his presumptive prison sentences for his convictions of unlawful possession of ammunition and violating a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO), arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motions for downward dispositional and durational departures. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because defendant failed to demonstrate that his offense was less serious than typical, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by treating it as a typical offense and imposing a presumptive sentence. Affirmed.
A23-1590 State v. Peaches (Ramsey County)
Criminal Order Opinions
Postconviction Relief
Timeliness
Petitioner challenged a District Court order denying his petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner argued that he was entitled to relief because in 2001 he entered an unintelligent guilty plea for second degree murder, and because, at the time he entered his plea, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner’s petition was untimely. Affirmed.
A24-0305 Cuypers v. State (Washington County)
Postconviction Relief
Timeliness
In his sixth petition for postconviction relief challenging his convictions on seven counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, petitioner argued that the state (1) failed to prove the elements of the conviction offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) “committed a sentencing defect.” The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner’s claims were statutorily time and procedurally barred, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying postconviction relief. Affirmed.