Listen to this articleCivil
Taxation
Income
This appeal from the Tax Court concerned the valuation of two commercial properties in a Woodbury shopping center. At issue were two questions about the Tax Court’s income capitalization approach to valuing the properties: (1) whether the Tax Court erred when it declined to use an effective rent calculation when estimating the properties’ value; and (2) whether the Tax Court erred when it declined to reduce the value of one of the properties to account for lease-up costs due to the property’s above-market vacancy rate. The taxpayer, relator, appealed the county’s initial assessments of the properties. At trial, the Tax Court heard testimony from three witnesses—the taxpayer’s real property asset manager, the taxpayer’s expert appraiser, and the county’s expert appraiser. Following trial, the Tax Court largely accepted the opinions of the county’s appraiser and rejected the opinions of the taxpayer’s appraiser. The Tax Court’s ultimate value conclusions increased the properties’ assessed market values over the county assessor’s initial valuations. In this appeal, the taxpayer contended that the Tax Court erred in its analysis by declining to use an effective rent calculation to determine potential gross income and by not deducting certain lease-up costs from the indicated value of one of the properties.
The Supreme Court held that (1) when calculating potential gross income under the income capitalization approach to valuation, the Tax Court did not err by declining to use an effective rent calculation to account for tenant improvement allowances because the taxpayer’s tenant improvement allowances were typical of the market; and (2) the Tax Court did not clearly err by declining to deduct lease-up costs from a property’s indicated value to account for its above-market vacancy rate on the assessment date because the taxpayer failed to show that such a deduction was required. Affirmed.
A23-1419, A23-1420 Tamarack Village Shopping Ctr., LP v. County of Washington (Tax Court)
Criminal
Assault
Self-Defense
This case presented a narrow issue of first impression—whether the duty to retreat when reasonably possible applies to a person who claims they were acting in self-defense when they committed the felony offense of second-degree assault-fear with a dangerous weapon. Defendant pulled out a machete on a light rail platform in downtown Minneapolis and brandished it at a woman and two men for nearly 1 minute, with the specific intent to cause them to fear immediate bodily harm. Based on this conduct, the State charged defendant with two counts of second-degree assault-fear with a dangerous weapon, a felony-level offense. Defendant claimed his actions were in self-defense. The District Court concluded that defendant’s actions were not authorized under Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3), because he had a reasonable opportunity to retreat and failed to do so. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the duty to retreat when reasonably possible—a judicially created element of self-defense—applies to persons who claim they were acting in self-defense when they committed the felony offense of second-degree assault-fear with a device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm; and (2) when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial disproves, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant’s claim that he lacked a reasonable opportunity to retreat. Affirmed.
A22-0432 State v. Blevins (Court of Appeals)
Contempt
Sentencing
In this case we are asked to address the authority of the District Court to sentence a defendant summarily for direct contempt. The District Court found defendant in direct criminal contempt of court for his profanity-laced outburst during a judicial proceeding that was partially directed at the District Court judge. The District Court then summarily imposed the maximum 180-day sentence allowed under its inherent authority. This appeal presents two questions: first, whether this appeal was moot because defendant has fully served his sentence; and second, whether a District Court was required to make a finding of extraordinary conduct when it summarily imposes the maximum 180-day sentence allowed by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that (1) this appeal was not moot because the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applied; (2) although 180 days is the maximum sentence allowed by law when direct contempt is summarily sentenced for punitive purposes under a District Court’s inherent authority, a District Court should, as a matter of comity to the Legislature, limit its sentence
—consistent with the maximum sentence for statutory misdemeanor contempt—to 90 days and a $1,000 fine unless the person’s conduct is extraordinary; and (3) in the exercise of its supervisory power to ensure the fair administration of justice, the Court announced that when a District Court determines in a contempt order that a defendant’s conduct is extraordinary, the court must make oral or written findings describing the extraordinary conduct within 7 days of the direct contempt order so that an appellate court is able to review the District Court’s order for arbitrariness, capriciousness, and oppressiveness. Reversed and remanded.
A22-1727 State v. Oberton (Court of Appeals)
Evidence
Harmless Error
The issue in this case was whether the Court of Appeals conducted an incorrect harmless-error analysis to assess the impact of erroneously admitted evidence when it affirmed defendant’s conviction for third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant, who was in his thirties, was charged with third-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually assaulting a 14-year-old victim. At trial, the state presented four witnesses, including the victim, and submitted more than 10 exhibits. Over defendant’s hearsay objection, the state introduced a video recording of the victim’s interview with an investigator and a social worker that was conducted shortly after the sexual assault. The jury found defendant guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of the recorded interview was reversible error. The Court of Appeals agreed that the video recording did not satisfy Rules 801(d)(1)(B) and 807 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error was harmless.
The Supreme Court held that (1) harmless-error review considers whether a reasonable possibility exists that the error significantly influenced the verdict, not merely whether the other properly admitted evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; and (2) the erroneous admission of the recorded interview was harmless because no reasonable possibility exists that the evidence significantly affected the jury’s verdict. Affirmed.
A22-1104 State v. Bigbear (Court of Appeals)
Evidence
Harmless Error
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree intentional murder and second-degree intentional murder under aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Defendant filed a direct appeal, which was stayed for her to pursue postconviction relief. The District Court summarily denied defendant’s postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court held that (1) it need not decide whether police questioning of defendant violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures because any claimed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) it need not decide whether the District Court’s restrictions on the cross-examination of defendant’s accomplice violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because any claimed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the District Court erred in entering convictions for both first-degree intentional murder and second-degree intentional murder; (4) the claims presented in defendant’s pro se supplemental brief did not warrant reversal of defendant’s convictions or a new trial; and (5) the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A22-0710, A23-0588 State v. Zielinski (Anoka County)
Murder
Aiding and Abetting
After a court trial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. On appeal, defendant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the shooter’s plan to murder the victim before the murder occurred.
The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for first-degree premeditated murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability, as a rational hypothesis existed that defendant only learned about the shooter’s plan after the murder occurred. Reversed
A23-0640 State v. Isaac (Clay County)
Postconviction Relief
Timeliness
This case requires a determination as to whether, under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a), a postconviction petition is timely when filed more than 2 years after a District Court imposed and stayed the execution of a defendant’s sentence, but within 2 years of that same sentence being executed without alteration. Petitioner contended that his postconviction petition was timely because he brought it within 2 years of a District Court order executing his previously stayed sentence.
The Supreme Court held that an order executing a previously imposed sentence without changing its substance is not a new “sentence” triggering the 2-year limitations period for filing of a petition for postconviction relief under § 590.01, subd. 4(a). Affirmed.
A23-0020 Brouillette v. State (Court of Appeals)
Sentencing
Criminal History Score
When a District Court calculates an offender’s criminal history score, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.B.2.a directs the court to assign the offender a custody status point if the offender was on “probation” after “entry of a guilty plea” to a felony offense at the time the current offense was committed. This case required a decisions as to whether this language from Guideline 2.B.2.a requires the District Court to assign a custody status point to a defendant who commits a new offense while subject to court-ordered conditions under a stay of adjudication following the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea to a felony offense. Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. When he committed the offense, defendant was subject to court-ordered conditions under a stay of adjudication following his guilty plea to a felony theft offense. At sentencing, the District Court included a custody status point in defendant’s criminal history score, concluding that the circumstances satisfied the requirements of Guideline 2.B.2.a. On appeal, defendant argued that because no conviction had been entered for his felony theft offense, he was not on “probation” and also that the District Court had not “entered” his guilty plea. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the term “probation” as used in Guideline 2.B.2.a(1) applies to a defendant subject to court-ordered conditions under a stay of adjudication following the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea to a felony offense; and (2) the phrase “entry of a guilty plea” as used in Guideline 2.B.2.a(2) refers to the defendant’s act of pleading guilty on the record. Affirmed.