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Eminent Domain
Attorney Fees
The issue for decision here was whether attorney fees awarded under Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a), are capped at the amount set in a contingent fee agreement between the landowner and the landowner’s attorney. When a landowner in an eminent domain proceeding is awarded just compensation in an amount over 40 percent greater than was offered by the government entity condemning their property, the landowner is entitled to an additional award of “reasonable attorney fees.” Here, respondent was awarded attorney fees after the State, through the Department of Transportation, took possession of some of respondent’s property using the “quick take” provision of Minnesota eminent domain law. The attorney fees award under eminent domain procedures exceeded the amount respondent owed his attorney under a contingent fee agreement. MnDOT argued an award of “reasonable attorney fees” cannot exceed the amount owed to the landowner’s attorney in a contingent fee agreement, while respondent claimed an award of “reasonable attorney fees” in an eminent domain dispute is any amount calculated by the lodestar method.
The Supreme Court held that an award of “reasonable attorney fees” under Minn. Stat. § 117.031(a) is determined by the lodestar method and thus is not limited to the amount owed pursuant to an attorney fee agreement. Affirmed.
A23-0036 State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Schaffer (Court of Appeals)
Public Employment
Vicarious Liability
This appeal required interpretation of Minnesota State Tort Claims Act, part of which allows for a state employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of an employee if those acts or omissions occur while the employee is acting within the scope of office or employment under circumstances where a private employer would be vicariously liable. Respondent brought an action against appellant Minnesota Department of Corrections for claims of battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence for an alleged sexual assault and sexual harassment by one of its correctional officers. The District Court dismissed respondent’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, concluding that the state employer was immune from the suit under the Act because the correctional officer was not acting within the scope of her employment when the alleged assault occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the Act consistent with common law principles of vicarious liability applicable to private employers, and therefore, that respondent’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive the motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court held that (1) for a state employer to be held vicariously liable for an employee’s intentional tort under the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act, the tort must: (a) be related to the duties of the employee, and (b) occur within work-related limits of time and place—consistent with the common law standard under which the employer, if a private person, would be vicariously liability; and (2) the District Court erred when dismissing a complaint against the Department for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the facts alleged in the complaint—including a state employee’s perpetration of a sexual assault and sexual harassment—could allow a jury to find that the state employee was acting within the scope of office or employment under circumstances where the Department would be liable under the common law for vicarious liability. Affirmed.
A22-0829 Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr. (Court of Appeals)
Orders
Attorney Discipline
Public Reprimand
Brooks R. Siegel was publicly reprimanded.
Attorney Discipline
Reinstatement
Mitchell J. Ask was reinstated to the practice of law.