Listen to this articleCriminal
Arrest
Probable Cause
Defendant appealed from a final judgment of conviction of first-degree murder while committing a drive-by shooting. Defendant contended that the district court erred in concluding that police had probable cause to arrest him. He also claimed that the police recklessly misrepresented material information in the application for a warrant to search his residence and that the district court clearly erred in finding otherwise. Defenant further argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence against an alleged alternative perpetrator. Finally, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion and violated his confrontation rights by denying his request to cross-examine the lead investigator about the investigation’s scope.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant; (2) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the police did not materially misrepresent information in the application for a warrant to search defendant’s residence; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence; and (4) the district court did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights by denying defense counsel’s request to cross-examine the lead investigator about whether police had investigated unnamed suspects from a prior shooting of one of the victims. Affirmed.
A23-0154 State v. Glover (Ramsey County)
Assault
Dangerous Weapons
This appeal required the interpretation of two criminal statutes in the context of a defendant who broke a broom handle over the head of his romantic partner. The State charged defendant with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon and felony domestic assault for striking his girlfriend over the head with a broom handle. A jury found defendant guilty of each charge, and the district court convicted defendant of both counts. Defendant challenged his convictions, claiming that the broom handle was not a dangerous weapon because the State did not prove he used it a manner likely to cause great bodily harm, and that his two convictions for one assaultive act was improper. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions.
The Supreme Court held that (1) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict of second-degree assault when the State presented evidence that an ordinary object was likely to produce death or great bodily harm in the manner in which it was used; (2) for purposes of Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(1), which provides that a person “may be convicted of either the crime charged or [a lesser degree of the same crime], but not both,” domestic assault is not a “lesser degree” of second-degree assault. Affirmed.
A22-0960 State v. Bradley (Court of Appeals)
Postconviction Relief
Newly Discovered Evidence
Petitioner argued that the district court abused its discretion when it summarily denied his petition for postconviction relief. In 2018, a jury found petitioner guilty of both third-degree criminal sexual conduct against a physically helpless person and attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court convicted petitioner of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced him to 48 months in prison and a 10-year period of conditional release following confinement. In his petition for postconviction relief, petitioner alleged that two of the State’s expert witnesses falsely testified and that the jury’s guilty verdicts were legally inconsistent. Petitioner submitted a new expert opinion and other evidence to support his claim that the State’s witnesses falsely testified. The district court summarily denied petitioner’s petition, concluding that the guilty verdicts were legally consistent and that petitioner’s false-testimony claim failed to satisfy the test set forth in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). The court of appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that (1) a new expert opinion that merely differs from a trial expert’s opinion does not establish that the trial expert’s opinion was false, and such a new expert opinion is properly analyzed as newly discovered evidence under the test set forth in Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1997); and (2) guilty verdicts for third-degree criminal sexual conduct and attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct are legally consistent. Affirmed.
A22-1063 Tichich v. State (Court of Appeals)
Accomplices
Jury Instructions
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), and kidnapping, all premised on aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. The convictions related to the kidnapping and murder of a realtor in a scheme involving defendant, his girlfriend, and two others. On direct appeal, defendant asserted two grounds to reverse his convictions for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, kidnapping, and felony murder. First, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial motion to suppress the cell-site location information (“CSLI”) for his cell phone because the facts alleged in the warrant application failed to establish probable cause to search the CSLI records of his cell phone carrier. Second, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by providing the jury a hybrid instruction that relieved the State of its burden to prove: (1) the elements of the offense were committed by a person; and (2) the defendant was criminally liable for that person’s actions.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress the cell-site location information for his cell phone because the facts alleged in the warrant application established probable cause to search the cell-site location information records of the defendant’s cell phone carrier; but (2) the district court abused its discretion by giving erroneous jury instructions on accomplice liability, and the error was not harmless because it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict. Reversed and remanded.