Listen to this articleCivil Nonprecedential
Contempt
Civil and Criminal
In this dispute over respondent-city’s enforcement of its short-term-rental ordinance, appellant challenged the District Court’s order finding him in constructive civil contempt and awarding to respondent the attorney fees it incurred in seeking to bring appellant into compliance with the injunction issued by the District Court. Appellant argued that the District Court improperly imposed a criminal-contempt sanction and that the order was not supported by the competent evidence in the record. Noting that the award of attorney fees to the city was not a punitive sanction, but compensation to the city for the costs it incurred as a consequence of appellant’s violation of the injunction, the Court of Appeals concluded that the award of attorney fees to the was not a criminal-contempt sanction. Furthermore, the record supported the District Court’s determination that appellant violated the injunction. Affirmed.
A23-0600 Norusis v. City of Marine on St. Croix (Washington County)
Domestic Relations
Child Protection; Sibling Visitation
Appellant, the adult sister of a child to whom the District Court terminated parental rights, challenged both the District Court’s denial of her request for court-ordered sibling visitation with the child and the discharge of her court-appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court made these decisions based on its misapprehension that the matter before it was an adoption matter rather than a juvenile-protection matter. Reversed and remanded.
A23-1162 In re Welfare of Child of C.R.H. (Rice County)
Domestic Relations
Child Protection; Termination of Parental Rights
In this termination-of-parental-rights appeal, appellant-mother argued that the record did not support the District Court’s determinations that: (1) respondent county made reasonable efforts toward reunification, (2) a statutory basis existed to involuntarily terminate her parental rights, and (3) termination was in the best interests of the children. Noting that the record contained ample evidence that the services provided—including mental-health services, chemical-dependency programs, and family therapy—were targeted toward mother’s unique circumstances and conformed to the problems presented, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children. Furthermore, the children’s best interests supported termination. Affirmed.
A23-1023 In re Welfare of Children of M.S.-I. (St. Louis County)
Domestic Relations
Child Protection; Termination of Parental Rights
Appellant-mother challenged the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the record did not support the District Court’s determinations that a statutory basis for termination was proved at trial and that the county made adequate efforts to reunite the family. Noting the District Court’s findings as to mother’s inability to demonstrate long-term sobriety, to establish a supportive network, and to provide stability for the children, the Court of Appeals concluded that the the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a statutory basis to terminate mother’s parental rights had been proved. Affirmed.
A23-1187 In re Welfare of Children of S.K. (Martin County)
Domestic Relations
Grandparent Visitation; Termination
Appellants challenged the District Court’s determination that Minn. Stat. § 518.18 did not apply to grandparent-visitation cases, which led to its denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss respondent’s petition as untimely, its not holding an evidentiary hearing, and its termination of appellants’ grandparent visitation; they also argued that Minnesota lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. The Court of Appeals held that § 518.18 does not apply to termination of grandparent visitation rights, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion to dismiss respondent’s petition as untimely. Affirmed.
A22-1663 Perry v. Swatlowski (Polk County)
Domestic Relations
Spousal Maintenance; Modification
In this appeal from an order denying a motion to modify spousal maintenance, appellant argued that the District Court abused its discretion by (1) determining appellant’s current income using a different “method” from the one used in the initial spousal-maintenance order, (2) including expenses paid by appellant’s company as part of appellant’s current income, and (3) considering appellant’s “historical income and disregarding evidence of current income.” The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined appellant’s current income and denied his motion, even though the District Court considered income not discussed in its initial maintenance order. Furthermore, there was no error in including specific personal expenses paid by appellant’s company, including attorney fees and travel expenses, as appellant’s current income, and consideration of historical income was within the District Court’s discretion. Affirmed.
A22-1696 Kilgore v. Brockman (Ramsey County)
Harassment Restraining Orders
Harassment
In this direct appeal from the District Court’s grant of a harassment restraining order (HRO), appellant argued that (1) the District Court used an incorrect definition of harassment, and (2) the record did not support the District Court’s findings. The Court of Appeals concluded that the acts of following, monitoring, or pursuing could constitute harassment under the definition of that term in Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). Affirmed.
A23-0624 McDougall v. Plumer (Beltrami County)
Human Services Licensing
Revocation
Relator challenged the revocation of its licenses to provide home- and community-based services, arguing that respondent-department erred in interpreting Minn. Stat. § 245A.04, subd. 7(d), to require revocation and that its decision was based on unlawful procedure and arbitrary and capricious. Noting that relator’s authorized agent and compliance officer controlled another entity that had its license revoked, and that agent owned 45 percent of relator, the Court of Appeals concluded that agent “held” relator’s licenses under the statute and revocation was required. Affirmed.
A23-0215 In re Crawford House, LLC (Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.)
Trusts
Contributions
On appeal in this trust dispute, appellant argued that the District Court erred in interpreting the trust; abused its discretion by declining to surcharge respondent-trustee for his alleged mismanagement of the trust; and abused its discretion by denying appellant’s request for reimbursement of his attorney fees. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plain and unambiguous language of the trust stated that an individual must have contributed to the trust in order to be entitled to trust contributions, and thus, any payments that appellant and his wife made to trustors that were not paid directly into the trust cannot be considered trust contributions. Affirmed.
A23-0604 In re Erlandson Irrevocable Tr. (Clay County)
Civil Order Opinions
Harassment Restraining Orders
Existing Orders
In one of numerous actions between disputing neighbors, appellant challenged the denial of his petition for an ex parte harassment restraining order (HRO) alleging that respondent had harassed appellant by riding a motorized bicycle on the sidewalk so fast that appellant was forced off the sidewalk to avoid being hurt. Noting that an HRO was already in place and issued in response to the same allegations, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.
A23-0990 Rickmyer v. Brooks (Hennepin County)
Landlord & Tenant
Eviction
Appellant-tenant challenged an eviction judgment, alleging the District Court erred in determining that she did not prove a valid retaliation defense. Noting that, although appellant complained to the property manager several times about hot water before she filed her petition, Minn. Stat. § 504B.441 did not provide a defense based on an expression of dissatisfaction to the landlord, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statutory retaliation defenses were unavailable to appellant. Affirmed.
A23-0740 Campbell Prop. Mgmt. v. Steiner (Stearns County)
Negligence
Pleading
Appellant challenged the dismissal for failure to state a claim of his action asserting that respondent negligently failed to mark a buried electrical cable, resulting in appellant’s electrocution when he struck the cable while operating an auger. The Court of Appeals concluded that, although the complaint did not allege facts in support of every element of a negligence cause of action, it gave fair notice to respondent of the alleged electrocution incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose appellant’s theory upon which his claim for relief was based. Reversed and remanded.
A23-0581 Schreyer v. USIC Locating Servs., LLC (Hennepin County)
Criminal Precedential
Juveniles
Continuances for Dismissal
Appellant argued that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate him delinquent of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct because it did not terminate his continuance for dismissal until after he turned 19 years old. The Court of Appeals held that, when the state moves to terminate a continuance for dismissal within the time frame specified under Minn. R. Juv. Deliq. P. 14.04, the District Court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over an adult defendant’s termination hearing under Minn. Stat. § 260B.193, subd. 5(c), to “conduct a trial” until the defendant turns 21 years old. Affirmed.
A23-0752 In re Welfare of M.A.B. (Itasca County)
Criminal Nonprecedential
Arrest
Suspicion
In this direct appeal from judgment of conviction for third-degree possession of a controlled substance, defendant argued that the controlled substance was discovered following an unlawful misdemeanor arrest and that the District Court erred by denying his suppression motion. Defendant contended his arrest was unlawful because the arresting police officer lacked probable cause to believe that he committed theft. Noting that that a retain loss-prevention officer observed defendant place smaller items within a larger item that he purchased, the Court of Appeals concluded that the police officer had probable cause to believe that he committed theft. Affirmed.
A22-1568 State v. Pike (Hennepin County)
Bonds
Reinstatement
Appellant-surety posted two bonds on behalf of defendant totaling $32,000 to secure defendant’s reappearance in the District Court following his arrest on multiple charges. Defendant did not appear, and the District Court ordered both bonds forfeited. The District Court extended the payment deadline, but after nine months of defendant’s failure to appear, it denied any further extensions and ordered immediate payment. Appellant apprehended defendant the following month and petitioned the District Court to order the bonds reinstated and discharged. The District Court denied the petition because more than 180 days had passed since the bonds were forfeited, applying Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 702(f). Noting that the terms of the rule were plain, the Court of Appeals concluded that appellant failed to establish that the District Court abused its discretion by strictly applying the rule. Affirmed.
A23-0498 State v. Hall (Anoka County)
Damage to Property
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for fleeing police in a motor vehicle, criminal damage to property, criminal vehicular operation, and driving while impaired, defendant argued that the evidence did not sufficiently support the jury’s guilty verdicts, contended that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, and contended that the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts. Noting that the circumstances proved were that defendant saw an officer in front of him, continued driving toward the officer at 51 miles-per-hour, described the situation as “playing chicken,” and then collided with the squad car, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence supported the conviction for criminal damage to property. However, the District Court erred by imposing three sentences based on a single behavioral incident. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A23-0160 State v. Ryan (Itasca County)
Jurors
Community Cross-Section
In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for first-degree aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, defendant challenged his conviction on two grounds. Defendant first argued that the District Court erred by denying his motion to strike the jury venire because it did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. Defendant also contended that the District Court clearly erred by denying his Batson challenge because the prosecution’s peremptory removal of the only Black prospective juror violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court of Appeals concluded that, without evidence of systematic exclusion, it could not conclude that defendant was denied a right to a jury trial by a fair cross-section of the community. Furthermore, the state offered a race-neutral reason for excluding the only Black prospective juror. Affirmed.
A22-1808 State v. Boyce (Hennepin County)
Plea Withdrawal
Fair & Just
In this consolidated appeal, defendant argued that the District Court erred in denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. He maintained that the pleas were induced by an illusory promise, a promise that the county attorney did not have the authority to fulfill, and that the pleas were therefore not voluntary. Noting that the terms of the plea agreement were fulfilled, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no illusory promise, the terms of the plea agreement were clear, and defendant’s pleas were voluntary. Affirmed.
A23-0025, A23-0027 State v. Johnson (Hennepin County)
Search Warrants
Probable Cause
In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for second-degree driving while impaired (DWI)-test refusal, defendant challenged the District Court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the complaint. He argued that the information provided by the unidentified 911 callers lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to give the police officer reasonable, articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. Noting that, although the officer lacked information about the callers’ identities, the callers’ face-to-face encounter with the officer and use of the 911 system contributed to their reliability, and that they physically pointed at defendant’s vehicle, the Court of Appeals concluded that the callers’ tips contained sufficient indicia of reliability. However, the District Court erred by imposing a 365-day sentence for a gross misdemeanor. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
A23-0475 State v. Klaysmat (St. Louis County)
Warrantless Searches
Automobile Exception
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for possession of a pistol without a permit and obstruction of legal process, defendant seeks reversal by challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges. Defendant asserted that the District Court erred by determining that the smell of marijuana, alone, provided sufficient probable cause for law enforcement to search his vehicle without a warrant. The Court of Appeals concluded that the odor of marijuana alone could not support probable cause for law enforcement to search defendant’s vehicle. Reversed and remanded.
A23-0251 State v. Robinson (Scott County)
Witness Tampering
Jury Instructions
Defendant challenged his convictions for aggravated first-degree witness tampering, first-degree witness tampering, and stalking as well as his sentences for aggravated first-degree witness tampering and stalking. He argued that the District Court (1) provided clearly erroneous jury instructions for aggravated first-degree witness tampering and stalking, (2) erred by sentencing him for both aggravated first-degree witness tampering and stalking, and (3) erred by entering convictions for both aggravated first-degree witness tampering and first-degree witness tampering. Noting that it was not clear or obvious that the District Court erred when it instructed the jury that it need not agree on which two acts satisfied the stalking definition, the Court of Appeals concluded that any error in the District Court’s jury instructions either did not affect defendant’s substantial rights or was not plain. However, the District Court erred by sentencing defendant for both aggravated first-degree witness tampering and stalking and by entering a conviction for a lesser included offense. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.