Civil
Administrative Procedure
Appeals
At issue in this case was whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed an administrative appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The underlying dispute involved an air emissions permit issued by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for the NorthMet mining project. The narrow legal issue before here was whether the service requirements in the judicial review provisions of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act require petitioners to serve appeal papers on a represented party’s counsel. After the Agency issued an air emissions permit to respondent, appellant-nonprofits challenged the permit by filing a certiorari appeal in the Court of Appeals. Respondent moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that appellants had failed to serve respondent’s counsel within 30 days of receiving the decision in accordance with the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act and the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court held that, to invoke appellate jurisdiction under the judicial review provisions of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, a petitioner may effectuate service on “parties to the contested case,” Minn. Stat. § 14.63, and “parties to the proceeding before the agency,” Minn. Stat. § 14.64, by serving those parties directly, whether or not they are represented by counsel. Reversed and remanded; appeal reinstated.
A22-0068 In re Issuance of Air Emissions Permit No. 13700345-101 (Court of Appeals)
Domestic Relations
Child Protection; Juvenile Courts
Appellant-father was convicted of an offense that arose out of the same circumstances as an offense enumerated in the predatory offender registration statute. While appellant was incarcerated, respondent-mother, gave birth to a child. The child was adjudicated as a child in need of protection or services. The juvenile court ordered genetic testing to determine paternity. Appellant’s genetic test confirmed that he was the child’s biological father, but he was not adjudicated as the father. The social services agency petitioned to terminate appellant’s parental rights because of his conviction for an offense that requires registration as a predatory offender. After a contested hearing, the District Court, acting as a juvenile court, terminated appellant’s parental rights. Appellant appealed the termination of his parental rights arguing, for the first time, that the juvenile court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights. Appellant also raised a statutory interpretation argument about the interplay between the child protection and predatory offender registration statutes. The Court of Appeals determined that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, rejected appellant’s statutory interpretation argument, and affirmed the juvenile court’s termination of parental rights.
The Supreme Court held that (1) the juvenile court has subject-matter jurisdiction over cases involving the termination of parental rights of presumed fathers; (2) the juvenile court may terminate parental rights if a parent is convicted of an offense that requires registration as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a); these offenses include convictions for both offenses enumerated in the predatory offender registration statute and non-enumerated offenses that arise out of the same circumstances as a charged enumerated offense. Affirmed.
A22-0589 In re Welfare of Child of S.B.G. (Court of Appeals)
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