Poole Borough Council v GN [2019] UKSC 25 is an important decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court, which took a unanimous approach as per the judgment of Lord Reed.
The appeal was concerned with the liability of a local authority for alleged negligent failure to exercise its social services functions so as to protect children from harm caused by third parties. The principal question of law which it raised was whether a local authority or its employees may owe a common law duty of care to children affected by the manner in which it exercises or fails to exercise those functions, and if so, in what circumstances.
The factual background was that of abuse and harassment said to have caused physical and psychological harm, by neighbours of the claimants on a council housing estate. The actions of the neighbours was reported to the council.
It was accepted (see [25]) that the relevant legislation did not create a statutory cause of action. The question was whether local authorities may instead be liable at common law for breach of a duty of care in relation to the performance of their functions under the Act.
Assumption of responsibility was identified as a crucial element (at [66]). The court held that an assumption of responsibility may arise out of the performance of statutory functions (at [72]) but the operation of a statutory scheme does not automatically generate an assumption of responsibility (at [73]).
The particulars of claim in this matter did not set out an arguable claim that the council owed the claimants a duty of care: [83].
At [81]:
In the present case, on the other hand, the council’s investigating and monitoring the claimants’ position did not involve the provision of a service to them on which they or their mother could be expected to rely. It may have been reasonably foreseeable that their mother would be anxious that the council should act so as to protect the family from their neighbours, in particular by re-housing them, but anxiety does not amount to reliance. Nor could it be said that the claimants and their mother had entrusted their safety to the council, or that the council had accepted that responsibility. Nor had the council taken the claimants into its care, and thereby assumed responsibility for their welfare. The position is not, therefore, the same as in Barrett v Enfield. In short, the nature of the statutory functions relied on in the particulars of claim did not in itself entail that the council assumed or undertook a responsibility towards the claimants to perform those functions with reasonable care.
And at [91]:
Reliance is placed on an assumption of responsibility arising from the relationship between the claimants and the council or its employees, but there is nothing to suggest that those relationships possessed the necessary characteristics for an assumption of responsibility to arise. Furthermore, it is clear that the alleged breach of duty, namely a failure to remove the claimants from the care of their mother, has no possible basis. Although the court does not have before it all the evidence which might emerge at a trial, there is no reason to believe that the claimants could overcome these fundamental problems as to the legal basis of their claim.