It is not uncommon for litigants to challenge costs that were incurred by the other side in connection with a successful anti-SLAPP motion. Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (b), provides that except as otherwise provided by statute, “a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action
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Should a court consider a plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in determining how much to award in fees for the defendant following a successful anti-SLAPP motion?
Plaintiffs often incorrectly point to their attorney’s fees and costs to set the standard for what is reasonable. Plaintiffs will urge a court to use their attorney’s claimed expenditure of time as the yardstick for an award of fees. However, courts “should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he…
May a trial court consider a defendant’s “walk away” offer when determining the reasonableness of fees following a successful anti-SLAPP motion?
In most cases a court is not permitted to consider settlement offers under Evidence Code section 1152, which makes “inadmissible” evidence that is offered to “prove [the offeror’s] liability for the loss.” The main purpose of this rule is to encourage settlement. However, that section does not prohibit a judge from considering a plaintiff’s rejection…
Does a claim for intentional physical distress exist under California law?
There is no cognizable claim for intentional infliction of physical distress under California law. See Free v. Peikar, No. 1:17-cv-00159 MSJ (PC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61985, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2017) (“Plaintiff has also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of physical distress. There is no such claim, however, under California law.”).…
Does California’s anti-SLAPP statute apply in bankruptcy court?
Confusion abounds among litigants as to whether and when the anti-SLAPP may apply in a given case. A common mistake is to assume that the statute does not apply in bankruptcy court. However, there is long-standing authority in the Ninth Circuit for the application of California’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court so long as the…
Must attorney-client confidences be revealed in order to obtain attorney’s fees after a successful anti-SLAPP motion?
After prevailing on an anti-SLAPP motion, counsel will file often file a separate motion for attorney’s fees and costs. In order to obtain a recovery, counsel has the burden to substantiate the fees and costs. While invoices are not required, courts often prefer them (or other detailed time entries).
One issue that comes up often…
May a court adjust the lodestar upward based on exceptional representation?
Under California Supreme Court Precedent, a trial court may adjust the lodestar figure based on factors such as the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the quality of representation. Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132; see also Edgerton v. State Personnel Board (2000) 83 Cal.Ap.4th 1350, 1363. In Edgerton, the court approved a 1.5x…
What is a contingent fee multiplier in the context of an anti-SLAPP fee motion?
In Ketchum, our State Supreme Court reiterated that fee awards should be fully compensatory. Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1133. The unadorned lodestar is computed by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by the prevailing hourly rate for private “attorneys in the community conducting ‘noncontingent’ litigation of the same type.” Id. “We remarked that the…
Is the reasonably hourly rate capped to what was paid by an insurer for purposes of determining the lodestar?
Losing plaintiffs often argue after an anti-SLAPP shellacking that a defendant is limited to what an insurance company paid defense counsel. Typically, those rates are “insurance rates,” and are thus way below market rates. But this is wrong.
Courts have consistently declined to cap the reasonable hourly rate to what was paid by an insurer.…
Are anti-SLAPP fees recoverable in federal court?
The short answer is, yes. The attorney’s fee provision under subdivision (c) of the anti-SLAPP statute is applicable in federal court in diversity cases. The reason it applies is because it is deemed “substantive” for purposes of the Erie doctrine, and thus it does not directly collide with procedural rules, e.g., FRCP rules 56, 12,…