Bruna Barbosa (Master in European Union Law by UMinho) 
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The outbreak of new conflicts in the vicinity of Europe highlighted its dependence on the United States (US) in terms of security and defence. However, the redefinition of the US geopolitical strategy has resulted in a gradual reduction of its investments in Europe. This is driven by a shift in US geostrategic priorities to regions far from Europe, such as the Indo-Pacific, due to the emergence of new powers, including China.

This circumstance demands a more active approach from the European Union (EU) in matters related to European security and defence. European thinking has undergone significant changes, notably by recognising the importance of investing in its strategic autonomy .[1], [2]

It is therefore essential to understand how the EU can position itself as a prominent “actor” in security and defence issues on an international scale. And also how the European Peace Facility (hereinafter EPF) effectively contributes to increasing the EU’s strategic autonomy.

In this context, the 2022 Strategic Compass – a document that outlines the EU’s strategic direction over the next decade – stands out to reinforce European security and defence ,[3] seeking to balance its power of influence (soft power) with its military capacity (hard power), in an environment of cooperation between all Member States, allowing for a reinforcement of the Union’s internal stability, in particular, vis-à-vis its neighbouring States.[4]

However, paraphrasing the former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen,[5] it is essential to understand that soft power, in isolation, does not constitute real power. Without the assistance of hard power capabilities to support its diplomacy, Europe could face challenges to its credibility and influence, risking becoming a mere global bystander.

As a result, without adequate military capabilities, the EU may be unable to exert its influence and power over neighbouring countries, leaving room for great powers such as Russia to ignore political pressures from the EU.

In fact, the protection of European citizens and the preservation of peace on our continent – ​​and beyond it – represents the essential core of the European project. In this context, the EU’s internal security is increasingly interconnected with international security.

European security currently faces transnational challenges that go beyond the EU’s direct sphere of influence, but still pose threats to its security. As a result, the spread of current conflicts, even if they are not directly linked to Europe, could increase the feeling of insecurity on the European continent, contributing to political instability even on a global scale.

Consequently, the importance of coordinating investments in military capabilities, cooperation between Member States, technological improvement, as well as achieving a cohesive political position, enabling greater efficiency in the security and defence sectors, is understandable. To this end, the EU must invest in building peace and battling current security and defence concerns, both in its neighbourhood and globally.

Indeed, the EU must increase its will to act, strengthen its resilience and ensure solidarity and mutual assistance. The achievement of strategic autonomy will only be possible through military forces capable of providing speed and a credible coercive character that assists political, diplomatic, and economic action.[6]

The impossibility of immediately changing the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as well as the impossibility of funding the EU budget for military issues, implies the use of extra-budgetary means must be used for the development and funding of this military aspect.[7]

For this reason, the operationalisation of the current European Strategy is guided, from the outset, by the reinforcement of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the Treaty of Lisbon. This is done through mechanisms, including the EPF, in order to establish a direction in the area of ​​defence, through recognition of current challenges and the existing strategic environment.

This mechanism was part of a set of initiatives that aim to increase the EU’s role in global security and defence,[8] which covers “external actions with implications in the military or defence domain”.[9] Due to its characterisation, it becomes a comprehensive mechanism when compared to other previously existing mechanisms.

Thus, with this EFP it appears to be the first time that Europe establishes budget lines for military components that cannot be covered by the Union budget, combining military force with the establishment of peace, including crisis management operations, peacekeeping and crisis response missions.[10]

Due to its financing capacity, the EFP allowed the strengthening of the military defence capabilities of external countries and EU partners. These actions are always subject to rigorous controls and conducted in accordance with Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law – which contributes to a more effective approach of preserving and maintaining peace. Furthermore, it enabled the provision of global support, including training, equipment, and other forms of assistance.

In summary, in addition to providing the possibility for the EU to finance common costs, it promotes the opportunity to plan and execute missions within the scope of the CDSP in an efficient and practical way, as well as the financing of operations linked to other international organisations, with the aim of guaranteeing the peace and security and therefore strengthening burden-sharing between Member States.[11]

This mechanism establishes a line of defence and security at a level that Europe has never achieved – despite the failed attempt in 1952 with the European Defence Community. In this logic, the EFP represents an attempt by the EU not to depend, solely and exclusively, on a transatlantic alliance to resolve conflicts and safeguard its own interests.

In fact, it should be said that the EFP would never be a duplication, but rather a complement to other organisations, especially with regard to NATO. This is because there are regions where the US does not want to take responsibility for controlling those conflicts. However, the EU itself – due to its proximity and indirect influence in these regions – can assume a preponderant role. This allows the EU to act together with its strategic partners when possible and necessary, anticipating, preventing or resolving current threats with greater readiness.

Despite being a European mechanism, the EFP brings together cooperation with third countries that face security challenges and that EU Member States decide to support. According to the European Commission, the objectives of this mechanism focus on increasing the effectiveness of military operations, supporting the EU’s external partners and expanding the scope of its actions and initiatives. Therefore, the EU’s global action with the EFP calls for a more active role with greater global reach, motivating not only African countries but also all the Union’s partner countries towards self-defence, increasing financial contributions and, above all, deepening defence cooperation between the various EU Member States, considering their collective interests.

In this sense, the EFP adopted – and adopts – the legal structure of the CFSP, in which Member States participate in decisions and, at the same time, contribute to the financing of operations and assistance measures[12]  – of course, the Member States are the ones who have the power to decide and control the financed activities. However, it is important to remember that, as it involves financing military operations, the activities require unanimity in the Council.

However, considering the possibility of Member States presenting proposals or vetoing their approval, they are granted the ability to establish and manage their own priorities. This allows for more conscious and considered decision-making, especially in sensitive assistance issues, such as those related to lethality.

Having arrived here, it is important to highlight that the EFP was designed above all to promote peace and security in the various regions of the world, acting more quickly, in situations that require more urgent intervention. This is because preventive intervention often avoids crises and conflicts from spreading in the future. To this extent, the EFP, in addition to expanding the strengthening of the EU’s role as a global actor, aims to assist and improve the military performance of Europe and partner countries, without compromising respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and always promoting democracy.

However, this instrument is delicate, requiring clear and transparent decisions, with a supervisory structure added to the activities it funds, so as to avoid a contradictory effect to that intended, preventing possible excessive and unresponsible actions. It is certain, however, that the instrument in question reveals weaknesses: political resistance and public opinion, bureaucracy, great dependence on NATO, as well as the budgetary decrease capable of compromising the efficiency and success of the EU’s actions and implementation in conflict prevention, promotion of peace and strengthening of international security. However, despite its weaknesses, the EFP, in addition to constituting an instrument specific to the EU and reflecting the Union’s unique approach to security and defence, represents a means adopted by the EU to establish cooperation in certain areas, and has so far proven to be tendentially efficient. Although some aspects of this mechanism need to be improved and discussed to effectively meet the EU’s peace, stability and security objectives, this EFP can and should be the way forward to achieve, above all, greater autonomous European defence.

Despite its importance, the EFP still does not receive the broad recognition it deserves, largely due to a lack of publicity about its initiatives and impacts, as well as its focus on specific areas. However, its purpose is to prevent and resolve conflicts, maintain peace, promote international values ​​and norms, and strengthen international security. To achieve these goals, the EFP collaborates with a variety of actors, including governments, non-governmental organizations, and civil groups, contributing to the creation of a safer and more stable global “environment”.

In this sense, the EFP, due to its defensive role, has been growing and becoming a contributory factor in the formation of the aforementioned European strategic autonomy, with several cases in which it has acted and established strong dynamics, with the purpose of achieving peace in conflict zones.

Concrete examples of the EFP’s success were evidenced by the implementation of assistance measures in several countries, such as the Republic of Mozambique, as well as, recently, support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Georgian Defence Forces.

At the initial stage of the EFP, the Council adopted a decision to provide an assistance measure worth 40 million euros to support the Republic of Mozambique. This measure, which complements previous financial assistance of 4 million euros, allowed the EU to support Mozambican military units trained by the EU training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique) and conduct security operations in the north of the country.

Recently, the Council decided to increase the financial limit of the EFP by 5 billion euros and allocate this additional amount specifically to Ukraine, through the creation of a specific assistance fund. This reinforcement will enable the EU to continue meeting the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by providing lethal and non-lethal military training and equipment.

Another recent case that exemplifies this commitment concerns the assistance provided to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, within the scope of the EFP, in the amount of 41 million euros. This funding will cover the supply of non-lethal equipment in areas such as mobility, aerial surveillance and logistics, strengthening military capabilities to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its citizens.

Lastly, the assistance measure aimed at the Georgian Defence Forces stands out, with an amount of 30 million euros. This initiative aims to finance activities to monitor and observe regional security. In addition, support will be allocated for technical training, acquisition of medical equipment and other necessary resources. This contributes to preventing conflicts and promoting stability in each region.

These are just a few examples of how the EFP has been – and is being – applied to promote peace and security in different regions. These cases highlight the advantage of using this mechanism, through investments in several areas, such as training security forces, monitoring conflicts and supporting peacebuilding initiatives.[13]

That said, the EFP could be, without a shadow of a doubt, a key piece in European strategic autonomy in ​​security and defence. This mechanism offers a range of diplomatic and operational tools that can serve to promote peace, security and European interests, in a context of constant change and international instability. However, the cooperation and commitment of EU Member States will be essential to achieve the desired benefits.

It will be important to adapt EFP strategies to the needs of each conflict situation, structuring it as a sufficiently flexible and adaptable mechanism. This can be achieved through greater cooperation with other security organizations, greater mediation and investment in conflict prevention capabilities (early identification of tensions, threats and greater dialogue), faster deployment of forces in record time, protection of civil and logistical support, guarantee of operational transparency, including responsibility for possible errors.

In short, the aim is to have an active EU capable of triggering a strong global impact, contributing to an effective multilateral system, so that a fairer, safer and more united world can be achieved.[14]

European strategic autonomy, together with the EFP and already established defence bodies such as NATO, is therefore crucial to ensuring true peace, both in Europe and globally. 

The path forward involves transforming the EU into a regional power with the capacity for military intervention in areas of conflict and close interest, aiming to become a reliable and respected partner in NATO. This would allow the EU to act in situations where the USA may not have an interest, while protecting its own interests.

In any case, it cannot be forgotten that political, economic and, above all, security dynamics are constantly changing in Europe and the world and that, for this reason, they will have a great influence on the progress of European strategic autonomy.


[1] Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on the global strategy on the EU’s foreign and security policy”, 17 October 2016. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/17/fac-eu-global-strategy/.

[2] Council of the European Union, “Council conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence”, 14 November 2016. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14/conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/.

[3] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade”, Press Release, 21 March 2022. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/.

[4] Zach Campbell, Caitlin Chandler and Chris Jones, “Hard Power: Europe’s Military Drift Causes Alarm”, The Guardian, 19 May 2021. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/19/hard-power-europes-military-drift-causes-alarm.

[5] NATO, “Remarks by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen”, 6 May 2013, updated 7 May 2013. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_100218.htm?selectedLocale=fr.

[6] Melissa Fonseca Vieira, Inês Marques Ribeiro and Pedro Seabra, “O Mecanismo Europeu de Apoio à Paz No Reforço Da União Europeia Como Ator Securitário”, Nação e Defesa, no. 158 (2021): 115-141.

[7] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security”, 7371/22, Brussels, 21 March 2022. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf.

[8] European Council, Council of the European Union, “European Peace Facility”. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/.

[9] Treaty on European Union. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

[10] European Council, Council of the European Union, “European Peace Facility”. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/.

[11] Oliver Krentz, “Common security and defence policy” in “Fact Sheets on the European Union”, October 2023. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/159/common-security-and-defence-policy.

[12] Council of the European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02021D0509-20230626.

[13] European Council, Council of the European Union, “Timeline – European Peace Facility”. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/timeline-european-peace-facility/.

[14] Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a better world”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2009. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d0928657-af99-4552-ae84-1cbaaa864f96/language-en.

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